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ABSTRACT
Although self-esteem reactivity plays a crucial role in the diathesis/stress model of
depression, refinement of the interactions between variables included in this model is
required. Specifically, the current research examined the extent to which cognitivepriming versus mood-state theory explains changes in participants’ self-evaluations
across multiple domains after exposure to experimental procedures that simulated
positive and negative life events. Of the 212 undergraduate student participants who
completed the pretest phase, 179 (128 female, 51 male) participants completed the
experimental phase. Eighteen participants were excluded from the experimental phase
due to elevated depression scores. The experimental methodology involved random
assignment of participants to one of four mood induction procedures (MIP). MIPs were
either positive or negative in mood, and either referenced the self or avoided reference to
the self. In addition to mood and self-reference, other factors hypothesized to influence
self-evaluation change included, a) the importance ascribed to self-evaluation domains,
and b) overgeneralization, a cognitive vulnerability argued to predispose individuals to
depression.
Mood induction procedures produced self-evaluation changes among the important
domains of self, and these patterns of change were interpreted within Beck’s (1987)
conception of sociotropic and autonomous self-schemata subtypes. Bower’s (1981)
associative network theory provided an additional theoretical context for understanding
the results, which were largely supportive of cognitive-priming theory. Unimportant selfevaluation domains were largely unaffected by the MIPs, contrary to hypotheses based on

111
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the mood-state theory, demonstrating the significant role of importance for the process of
self-evaluation.
Overgeneralization also influenced self-evaluation change, however, results directly
contrasted predictions; participants who reported low and medium, rather than high,
levels of baseline overgeneralization reported decreased self-evaluations. Nevertheless,
results offer further support for cognitive-priming conceptualizations of self-esteem
reactivity, particularly the strong association between overgeneralization and fluctuations
in autonomous domains of self. Theoretical implications related to the trait nature of
overgeneralization (cognitive process) and self-schemata (cognitive structures) are
discussed. The advantages and limitations of employing priming methodologies within
cognitive research are also reviewed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Depression is currently one of the most common of all disorders seen in
primary care settings (Arean, McQuaid, & Munoz, 1997). Lifetime prevalence rates
of depression have been estimated to be as high as 17% (Kessler et. ah, 1994), and a
recent analysis places the 12-month prevalence rate for depression in Canada at 6%
(Stephens, Oulberg, & Joubert, 1999). Depressive symptoms are significantly
associated with chronic health problems and physical restriction (Stephens et. ah,
1999), as well as increased risk of suicidal behaviors (Teuting, Koslow, &
Hirshfeld, 1981). The total annual cost of depression for the United States has been
estimated at $44 billion (Greenberg, Stiglin, & Finkelstein, 1990), which includes
direct health care costs of treatment and indirect costs incurred through lost work
days, mortality, morbidity, and decreased productivity (Zhang, Rost, Furtney &
Smith, 1999).
Self-esteem has been studied as an important determinant of mental health,
and research indicates that people with low self-esteem report significantly higher
levels of life stress (Stephens et al., 1999), and have an increased risk of suicidal
behavior (Beautrais, Joyce, & Mulder, 1999). Both depression and self-esteem have
been connected with substance abuse among adolescents (Wasson & Anderson,
1995). Elucidation of factors that impact upon depression onset and maintenance, as
well as the role of self-esteem in these processes, would likely lead to improved and
more cost-effective treatment strategies.
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The construct of “self” plays a significant role in theoretical and research pursuits
that examine ontological determinants of depression (Alloy, Abramson, & Hogan,
1997; Hammen, 1985; Showers, Abramson, & Hogan, 1998). A clear pattern emerging
from empirical investigations is that individuals experiencing depression engage in
chronic negative self-evaluations (Kemis et al., 1998). A review of recent literature
suggests that self-esteem that is overly reactive to daily life stress places individuals at
a heightened risk for depression (Roberts & Gotlib, 1997; Roberts & Monroe, 1994). A
prevailing cognitive formulation of depression capable of explaining this finding is the
Diathesis-Stress model. Within this framework, preexisting cognitive vulnerability
factors (the diathesis) are postulated to contribute to a depressive response to negative
life events (the stress) that hold implications for an individual’s sense of self.
Beck (1967, 1976,1987) proposed that a depressed individual’s sense of self is
best described within the context of a depressive self-schema. A self-schema has been
defined as a cognitive structure composed of self-descriptive attributes or traits
represented in an organized fashion in semantic memory, with exposure of one attribute
automatically leading to activation of the others. The function of a depressive self
schema involves the biased processing of self-referent information, such that selfevaluations are negative and often lead to self-disparaging comments, low expectations
of personal effectiveness, and harsh self-punitiveness (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998;
Segal & Vella, 1990). Cognitive vulnerabilities represent variables that measure the
mechanistic operations of depressive self-schemas, which lead to fluctuations in self
esteem and subsequent depression.
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An ongoing area of debate within this field is whether negative cognitive structures
involving the self cause, or are merely associated with, depression (see Kelvin, Goodyer,
Teasdale, & Brechin, 1999 for a review). Early research investigating this debate
provided equivocal results (Persons & Miranda, 1992), with some research supporting the
predictive validity of cognitive vulnerabilities (Hammen, Marks, Mayol, & deMayo,
1985; Metalsky, Halherstadt, & Abramson, 1987), whereas other research suggested a
non-causal, concomitant function (Dobson, 1986; Kuiper, Olinger, & McDonald, 1988;
Swallow & Kuiper, 1987). Efforts to reconcile contradictory evidence have variously
focused on the notion of activating latent cognitive vulnerabilities before their predictive
function occurs (Segal & Ingram, 1994), matching individual differences in cognitive
vulnerabilities to specific types of negative life stress (Hammen, Marks, Mayol, &
deMayo, 1985), and the use of prospective studies that better address questions of
causality (Edelman, Ahrens, & Haaga, 1994; Kemis et al., 1998). Although these
research efforts provide further support for the Diathesis-Stress model of depression, not
all controversies have been put to rest.
One contentious issue surrounds the specific mechanisms responsible for the
activation of depressive self-schemas. Two opposing theories, the mood-state and the
cognitive-priming perspective, propose different causal mechanisms. The mood-state
hypothesis (Brosse, Craighead, & Craighead, 1999; Miranda & Gross, 1997) predicts that
because depressive thoughts about the self likely develop in a negative emotional context,
they should be linked to the associated mood in memory. Accordingly, derogatory selfevaluations, indicative of low self-esteem, remain latent until cued by the reemergence of
their associated mood-state. In contrast, the cognitive-priming hypothesis (Slyker &
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McNally, 1991; Riskind, 1989) posits that negative life events that reference the self
prime negative cognitive structures independent of their effects on mood. It is the
cognitive aspect of an experience that influences peoples’ self-esteem. Determining the
primacy of either cognition or emotion as the primary mechanism responsible for self
esteem reactivity requires a combined focus on both the self-referent nature of life events,
as well as the personal importance of self-evaluations that differentially influence a
person’s sense of self-worth.
Research exploring these contentious issues has theoretical merit. Further
elaboration on the primacy of cognition or emotion in the activation of a depressive self
schema would have a direct influence on theoretical formulations of depression.
Examination of potential interactions between a cognitive vulnerability and specific life
events, and determining whether activation of the vulnerability is necessary before it
moderates self-esteem reactivity, would also further refine the Diathesis-Stress model of
depression. Finally, a better understanding of whether importance impacts the process of
self-evaluation would contribute to the advancement of knowledge by providing greater
specificity for existing depression models.
Clinically, elucidating the factors that cause/moderate reactivity in self-esteem is
worthy of study given the observed role that self-esteem plays in the development of
depression. This worth is evident in the cognitive-behavioral approach to therapy, which
involves an initial examination of the individual’s self-schemas and addresses their
assumptions about the self (Freeman & Dattilio, 2000). The emotion versus cognition
primacy debate is also applicable to psychological treatment interventions. Some
therapies (cognitive/behavioral) target the correction of distorted cognitions that represent
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cognitive vulnerabilities, whereas other therapies encourage clients to process unresolved
emotions (emotion-focused). Freeman and Fusco (2000) clarify the clinical importance of
understanding the overlap between cognitive vulnerabilities and a depressive self-schema
in their discussion of the therapeutic process; “the distortions become the thematic
directional signs that can then be used to point to the underlying schema” (p. 37).
Research on this topic can also benefit treatment interventions for mental disorders
other than depression. For example, two main criteria associated with borderline
personality disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders (4^^ ed.,
1994) involve; a) identity disturbances with severely unstable self-image or sense of self,
and b) severe reactivity of mood (depression) leading to marked instability. Research that
incorporates both self-esteem reactivity and variables derived from a depression model
may also strengthen future therapeutic work with this population.
Definitions of Constructs
Research in the area of self psychology has been hindered by definitional confusion.
A primary source of confusion is the ambiguous distinction between self-concept and
self-esteem, terms that researchers have often used interchangeably (Shavelson et al.,
1976). Hattie (1992) states that self-concept and self-esteem represent the two main
categories focused on in self research, and that these terms signify different aspects of the
self system. Although this statement is echoed by a majority of researchers (Brinthaupt &
Erwin, 1992; Campbell, 1990), the conceptual distinction remains somewhat unclear.
Reasoner (1986), for example, proposes that self-esteem is made up of five components,
one of which is self-concept. In contrast, Byrne (1996) states that self-concept, which
includes cognitive, affective and behavioral aspects, is a much broader construct within
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the self system than self-esteem. Self-esteem is conceived of as a “more limited
evaluative component of the broader self-concept term” (Byrne, 1996, p. 5). Campbell’s
(1990) information processing framework also proposes an overlap between these terms.
She argues that “evaluation (self-esteem) may play a critical role both in the structure of
the self-concept and in its interface with external information” (p. 539). Campbell’s
proposal of evaluative (self-esteem) and knowledge (self-concept) components of the
self-system are closely mirrored by Brinthaupt and Erwin (1992), who argue that selfconcept represents self-descriptions, whereas self-esteem represents self-evaluations.
One factor potentially useful in clarifying the close connection between self-esteem
and self-concept is the element of importance. James’ (1890) early writings on selfconcept postulated that an individual’s global self-esteem is largely influenced by their
perceived competence in domains of importance. This sentiment remains a focal point for
current research on the self (Harter, 1996; Marsh, 1986,1995; Sedikides, 1995).
“Domains of importance” can be understood as representing the structure of the selfconcept or self-description/knowledge components that individuals hold for themselves.
Hattie (1992) distinguishes between self-concept and self-esteem based on the extent to
which the self attribute being investigated is important. Accordingly, self-evaluations will
occur for different domains of the self-concept, but these evaluations will impact upon
self-esteem only if they refer to domains considered important by the individual.
Theories of Self-concept
Numerous theoretical frameworks have been proposed to account for the construct
of self-concept. Differences between these theoretical frameworks relate to both the
underlying structure of the self-concept, as well as the appropriate relations among the
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elements composing the self-concept. A discussion of contemporary theories of selfconcept must initially pay tribute to the past writings of James (1890). His conception of
self discriminated between two fundamental aspects; an “I-self” and a “Me-self”. The
process of organizing and interpreting one’s experiences (self-evaluations) was the role
of the subjective I-self. The I-self was contrasted with the Me-self, which represented a
collective understanding of things objectively known about the self (self-descriptions).
James postulated that the I-self was the active agent responsible for constructing the Meself (Harter, 1996), which again highlights the complex interactions within the self
system.
Another early writer who examined the self was Cooley (1902). He incorporated
social processes into the development of self-concept. Cooley’s “looking glass self”
suggests that self-worth is directly related to an individual’s interactions with others.
Positive or negative regard from significant others represents a social mirror through
which people detect their opinions towards the self. This early social conception of the
self also remains viable in present day theories and research.
A more recent theory is offered by Shavelson (1976) who argues that self-concept is
constructed via self-perceptions, which are formed through experience with, and
interpretations of, the environment. These self-perceptions are particularly shaped by
evaluations of significant others, reinforcements, and behavioural attributions of the self
and others. Markus (1977, 1980, 1990), working from a social-cognitive framework,
postulates that the self represents a dynamic system of constructs that are collectively
labeled cognitive self-schemas.
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Markus’s programmatic research provides an information-processing model for
researching self. She defines self-schemas as “cognitive generalizations about the self,
derived from past experience, that organize and guide the processing of self-related
information contained in the individual’s social experience” (Markus, 1980, p.64). These
self-schemas also influence how information related to the self is attended to, interpreted,
stored, and retrieved (Markus, 1977). Dobson (1986) makes the link between self
schemas and self-concept explicit by asserting that self-schemas define our sense of self
by the process of identifying, and allowing into memory, information relevant to our selfconcept.
Although the construct of self-schema has been criticized (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983,
1986) on the grounds that its existence can not be directly verified, its operation on
human information-processing styles can be observed and measured. Research
examining the role of self-reference in schematic processes (Dobson, 1986) provided an
appropriate methodology for early studies. Self-reference tasks typically require
individuals to rate a series of adjectives for their personal relevance. Endorsement of
certain types of adjectives, reaction times for such ratings, as well as recall of the
adjective list allow indirect examinations of particular types of self-schemas. Empirical
support for the self-schema construct is obtained by the finding that recall and ratings of
self-referent information, as well as judgements about the self, are performed more
efficiently and accurately than similar recall or judgments of material irrelevant to the
self (Dobson, 1986; Segal & Vella, 1990; Teasdale & Dent, 1987), or information that
focuses on others (Kuiper & MacDonald, 1982; Mathews & Bradley, 1983).
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Further support for the existence of self-schemas is provided by Kuiper (1981), who
had individuals rate a list of personality adjectives in terms of their self-reference and
self-description. Reaction times for these ratings were analyzed and indicated that the
degree of self-description (low, medium, high) created an inverted-U shape for the length
of self-referent ratings. High and low self-referent judgements were made more quickly
relative to medium judgements, indicating that descriptions that clearly reflect or do not
reflect the self-schema are processed more quickly.
Markus and Nurius (1986) expand upon self-schemas by positing that all individuals
possess “possible selves”, which represent schemas of potential conditions of the self to
be imagined, hoped for, or dreaded. These possible selves “provide an evaluative and
interpretive context for the current view of the self” (p. 995). An important aspect
incorporated into Markus’s (1980) writings on possible selves and self-schemas indicates
that people hold multiple self-views that represent domain-specific knowledge structures,
which collectively embody the core of the self-concept. The overlap between the
evaluative component of the self (self-esteem) and the knowledge component of the self
(self-concept) is evident again.
Global versus Multidimensional Models of Self-concept
The issue of domain-specific knowledge structures discussed by Markus (1980) is
important for theoretical models of the self. Is the construct of self-concept best
understood as a global entity, or is it composed of multiple dimensions? Both James
(1890) and Cooley (1902) articulated an overall or global sense of self-worth. However,
James also was the first to propose a multidimensional model of self, which set up a
hierarchy of the self -system with material and social aspects of the self in a subordinate
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role to a more enduring spiritual self. An examination of empirical findings related to
these models helps to answer this question. Children have been shown to hold distinct
evaluative judgements for the self across different domains, which led initial proponents
of the unidimensional model (Piers & Harris, 1977) to later conclude that self-concept is,
in fact, multidimensional in nature.
The construct validity of multidimensional models of self are currently well
supported in the literature and this conception is argued to capture the phenomenology
associated with the process of self-evaluation (Bracken, 1996; Harter, 1985,1990; Marsh,
1986, 1987, Marsh & Hattie, 1996). Shavelson and colleagues (1976) proposed a model
of self-concept that integrates a global sense of self into a multidimensional perspective.
Echoing the early work of James (1890), these theorists developed a hierarchical model
(refer to Figure 1) of self-concept that locates global evaluations of self as a higher order
factor that comprises multiple, domain specific self-concepts. Although these specific
domains are correlated, they can be interpreted as separate constructs. The notion of a
global self-concept appears to blur the distinction between self-esteem and self-concept. I
suggest that this higher order factor may actually represent a global level of self-esteem,
based on self-evaluations of competencies in distinct domains of self-concept.
The hierarchical, multidimensional model provides a broad framework for exploring
the structure of the self-concept. Based on Shavelson et al.’s model. Marsh developed a
series of measures (Self Description Questionnaires I - III; 1986,1987, 1989) which
assess self-concept at different ages. Based on his research with late adolescents, Marsh
revised Shavelson’s model by dividing the peer scale into same sex and opposite sex
dimensions, and added scales to represent emotional stability, problem solving.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

G eneral
Self-C oncept

General

Academic and
Nonacademic
Self-Concept

Academ ic
Self-C oncept

N onacadem ic Self-C oncept

Social

Emotional

Self-C oncept

Self-C oncept

Physical
Self-C oncept
CD

Q.

T3

Subareas of
Self-Concept

Evaluation of
Behavior in
Specific
Situations

English

History

Math

S cience

P e e rs

Significant
O thers

Particular
Emotional
S ta te s

CD

Physical

Physical

Ability

A ppearance

O
Q.
C
o
c33
T3
O
Q.
gj

CD

DDDO DD00 ODDO ODDO

ODOO GOOD DDDO 0 0 0 0
Q.

O
O
CD

Figure 1. Shavelson’s heirarchical model of self-concept
((/>
/>
CD

Q.

■D
O
3
■0D
CD

CD

01

12

religion/spiritual, honesty/trust, and a global self-concept scale. Furthermore, he
questioned the validity of a strong hierarchical approach to self, for, although the
observed pattern of correlations among the different dimensions of self-concept were
consistent with expectations, the correlations were very small (mean r -.09).
Confirmatory factor analysis research, however, strongly supports the construct validity
of these self-concept measures for all proposed self-concept dimensions (Marsh, 1990).
Importance of Self-concept Domains
A major criticism levied against the hierarchical model is that it doesn’t account for
the possibility that domains of self-concept may be differentially important to global selfconcept. Recall that the Jamesian (1890) perspective postulates that individuals who feel
competent in areas that they believe are important will have a healthy global self-esteem,
whereas feelings of incompetence in these important areas leads to a derogatory global
self-esteem. Conversely, self-concept in domains deemed unimportant by an individual
should not have an influence on global self-esteem (Byme, 1996; Harter, 1996).
Kelly (1955) incorporated the role of differential importance into a hierarchical
theory of self by proposing that some aspects of the self represent “core” aspects that are
relatively high in personal descriptiveness and importance, whereas “peripheral” aspects
are relatively low in personal descriptiveness and importance (Harter, 1996; Sedikides,
1995). Peripheral aspects are argued to play a trivial role in the maintenance of personal
identity and self-esteem. Kelly’s (1955) theory is supported by research reported by
Markus and Wurf (1987) who showed that certain self-descriptions are indeed high in
personal relevance and function as core characteristics, compared to peripheral
characteristics that were rated as less personally relevant.
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A current area of debate related to the importance of self-concept domains
focuses on the appropriate method of weighting importance ratings: nomothetic vs.
idiographic. A nomothetic approach follows a strict hierarchical model and proposes that
normative importance (i.e., group mean ratings of importance for self-concept domains)
should be used to predict global self-concept. The idiographic approach, however,
postulates that self-concept may be hierarchically organized but this hierarchy differs
from person to person. Thus, intra-individual differences in importance ratings (i.e.,
differential importance) should be used to predict global self-concept (Pelham, 1995).
Supporting the nomothetic approach is the research of Harter (1985,1990) who has
consistently shown that competence in areas that are deemed important by group norms
are more highly correlated with global self-esteem (r = .70) than competence in domains
rated as unimportant (r = .30). Marsh (1993) has also shown that normative importance
ratings accounted for more of the variance in global self-concept than that accounted for
by differential importance ratings. Pelham (1995), however, has cogently argued that an
idiographic approach needs to be considered, for, although normative importance plays a
large role in predicting global self-concept, differential importance is still a significant
predictor of global self-concept when normative importance is statistically controlled for.
Additionally, Pelham (1995) argues that differential importance may be more predictive
of global self-concept for individuals who possess relatively negative overall^ selfconcept rather than positive overall self-concept. Pelham (1995) concludes that
“researchers who wish to understand self-esteem must focus on the intra-individual
patteming of people’s self-views (and their investments in these self-views)” (p. 1164).

' Overall self-concept refers to a composite measure of multiple domains of self-coneept, excluding global
self-concept.
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Despite the disagreement over whether importance of self-concept domains should be
investigated with a nomothetic versus idiographic approach, both perspectives emphasize
that the nature of self-concept is multifaceted in structure.

Cognitive Models of Depression
Depressive Self-schemas
Cognitive theories of depression explicitly incorporate the self into their causal
models. This inclusion affords an examination of how cognitive and affective processes,
and their interaction with the self, impact on depression. Beck, Rush, Shaw and Emery
(1979) assign particular importance to the influence of cognitive formulations in the
etiology of depression. Their cognitive distortion theory proposes that depressed
individuals characteristically hold negative, pessimistic thoughts about the self, their
current situation, and their future. These negative thoughts are hypothesized to result
from a specific style of information processing that distorts cognition. The distortions of
depressed individuals include selective attention to negative, rather than positive,
information, resulting in inappropriate inferences about their own actions and those of
others. These distortions represent dysfunctional attitudes that predispose individuals to
depression (Beck 1967,1976). Furthermore, he stipulates that these dysfunctional
attitudes are closely associated with a stable and enduring “depressive self-schema”.
Recall that self-schemas exert a significant influence on information-processing by
guiding selective attention to information (from both external and intemal sources), as
well as by influencing both the encoding and retrieval of information (Segal & Ingram,
1994). Accordingly, a depressive self-schema, which guides the perception, evaluation,
and memory of personally relevant experiences, results in a negatively biased construal
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of the self and environment (Alloy et al., 1997). A depressive self-schema, therefore
appears to influence both the structure of the self-concept, and the process of selfevaluation and subsequent self-esteem.
Evidence for the operation of depressive schemas is offered by Kuiper and
MacDonald (1982), who examined self-referential processes in college students who
were either depressed or non-depressed. Enhanced recall of non-depressed content
material was observed in the non-depressed group, whereas the depressed group showed
equal recall of depressed and non-depressed content.
Types of Cognition
Ingram (1990) has suggested that cognitive constructs can be differentiated
according to whether they represent primarily cognitive products (e.g. self-statements),
cognitive content, cognitive processes (e.g. cognitive vulnerabilities), or cognitive
structures (e.g. self-schemas). Clarification of different types of cognitions helps to
understand the mechanisms involved in cognitive models of depression. This is
particularly important considering that research measures typically assess cognitive
products, rather than cognitive processes or structures (Segal & Ingram, 1994). The focus
on measuring cognitive products is potentially misleading, given that cognitive theorists
predict that improvements in cognitive products occur with remission of depression, but a
vulnerability to future depressive episodes remains due to trait-like, stable cognitive
processes or structures that do not improve with remission (Segal, 1988, Ingram,
Miranda, & Segal, 1998).
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Proposed Cognitive Vulnerabilities
Various cognitive vulnerability factors have been proposed within models of
depression, often targeting different types of cognitions. Ellis’s original theory (1962), as
well as its most recent iteration in the form of rational-emotive behavioural therapy
(1994; 1996) posits errors in thinking (i.e., cognitive processes), related to rigid standards
applied to oneself and others, predispose individuals to experience disappointment and
become depressed. Although not specific to depression, these irrational beliefs represent
cognitive vulnerabilities to developing psychological disorders.
Seligman’s reformulated learned helplessness/hopelessness theory (Abramson,
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989) examines the
cognitive processes involved when an individual searches for the causes of events. This
theory postulates that explanations for negative events may be pathological, leading to
feelings of helplessness and/or hopelessness, which then result in depression. These
maladaptive interpretations of events are conceptualized as depressogenic attributional
styles that represent cognitive vulnerabilities. Specifically, predisposition to depression
occurs by attributing negative events to stable, global and intemal causes, rather than
interpreting them as transitory, specific to certain situations, or due to extemal,
environmental factors. Similar to the majority of cognitive models of depression, this
depressogenic attributional style serves as the casual factor in the development of
depression.
Carver and Ganellen (1983) advance cognitive processes involving self-punitiveness
as markers of cognitive vulnerabilities. They note that three specific processes
predisposed individuals to depression: (a) Holding goals or standards that are too high.
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(b) being especially critical to deviations from these standards, and (c) the tendency to
generalize from a particular negative event to the overall sense of self-worth.
Beck’s theorizing (1967,1976,1987) on depressive self-schemata shifts the putative
cause for depression (i.e., vulnerability) to the level of cognitive structures, and the
content represented within them. Dysfunctional/depressive cognitive schemas predispose
individuals to experience depression.
Diathesis-Stress Model of Depression
Despite the different cognitive vulnerabilities advanced by the varied theorists,
they all can be interpreted within a more complex conception of depression; the
Diathesis-Stress model. This model places the depressed individual within an
environmental context. Within this framework, preexisting cognitive vulnerability factors
(the diathesis) are postulated to contribute to a depressive response to negative life events
(the stress). Beck’s (1967) original thesis did incorporate these variables, as well as the
self, by stipulating that, for cognitively vulnerable people, stressful life events precipitate
a pattern of negative, biased, self-referent information processing that represents the first
step in the downward cycle of depression. Beck appears to draw a link between cognitive
processes and structures. The negative content contained within a depressive self-schema
guides the cognitive processes of the depression prone individual. Nonvulnerable
individuals, who do not have depressive self-schemata, do not engage in such selfdeprecating processes and consequently do not become depressed. Attributional styles,
self-punitiveness, cognitive errors, and other cognitive vulnerabilities are likewise
proposed to interact with life stress, and collectively represent possible etiological
predictors of depression.
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Criticisms of Cognitive Models of Depression
Despite the intuitive appeal of these cognitive accounts for hypothesized causes
of depression, early research examining these theories was criticized for varied reasons.
The most striking criticism was that proposed cognitive vulnerabilities became
undetectable in remitted depressives (Hammen, Miklowitz, & Dyck, 1986; Persons &
Rao, 1985), which suggested that these dysfunctional attitudes and attributions were
merely concomitants of depression, not causes. Another early criticism targeted the lack
of research examining the influence of specific types of stress within the Diathesis-Stress
model. Methodological concerns were also raised by some theorists related to the
artificial nature of experimental stimuli. Finally, Stoppard (1989) was vocal in her
criticism of the cognitive model’s inability to account for observed sex differences in
rates of depression. Each of these criticisms will be discussed in turn, and current
approaches to addressing these issues will be reviewed.
Lack of Cognitive Vulnerabilities in Remitted Depressives
Early empirical support for the Diathesis-Stress model of depression was equivocal
at best (Showers et al., 1999). Attempts to demonstrate a causal connection between
cognitive vulnerabilities and depression were generally viewed as unsuccessful (Persons
& Miranda, 1992; Segal & Ingram, 1994). Although some researchers cited evidence that
negative cognitions in non-depressed individuals could predict future depressive episodes
(Hammen, Marks, Mayol & deMayo, 1985; Metalsky, Halberstadt, & Abramson, 1987),
the majority of research indicated that strong differences in self-schemas were only found
between depressed and non-depressed persons, with remitted depressives often evincing
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cognitive structures similar to never depressed individuals ( Dobson & Shaw, 1986;
Kuiper, Olinger, & MacDonald, 1988; Swallow & Kuiper, 1987).
Dobson and Shaw (1986) presented a list of depressed and non-depressed personal
adjectives to depressed psychiatric, non-depressed psychiatric, and nonpsychiatric
patients. The depressed group recalled more of the depressed adjectives, and rated them
as more self-descriptive overall, compared to the other two groups. However, when these
same participants were retested after remission, they showed no recall bias for the
depressed adjectives and also rated the non-depressed words as being more selfdescriptive.
Opponents to the depressive self-schema construct began to discuss the difficulty of
showing stable cognitive vulnerabilities in remitted depressives (Coyne and Gotlib,
1983). Accordingly, many researchers (Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Carver, La Voie, Kuhl,
& Ganellen, 1988; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983, 1986; Dobson, 1986) have concluded that
there are no enduring, stable, depressive schemas. The presence of distorted cognitions or
negative attributions might merely represent a concomitant to depression, rather than an
onset vulnerability factor as proposed by the cognitive models. Other researchers
(Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & Ranklin, 1981) have reversed the causal order
between a depressive self-schema and depression by proposing the “scar hypothesis”
which posits that distorted cognitions are a result of a depressive episode.
Reconciling Contradictory Evidence Using Priming Methodology
Segal and Ingram (1994) reconcile contradictory findings related to the causal role of
cognitions within the Diathesis-Stress model in their seminal article that highlights the
importance of conceptualizing depressive self-schemas as latent cognitive structures.
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Before the influences of these self-schemas become evident and overtly testable, they
must first be activated by some type of priming procedure (Kelvin et al., 1999; Segal &
Ingram, 1994). Priming procedures involve the activation of a hypothetical mental
structure. Cognitive researchers studying depression typically have examined the
activation processes of negative, self-referent cognitive structures through the induction
of a negative mood (Segal & Ingram, 1994). These issues of latency and activation had
already been discussed by Beck and his colleagues (1979), who stated.
The theory proposes that early experiences provide the basis for forming negative
concepts about the self.... These ... may be latent but can be activated by specific
circumstances which are analogous to experiences initially responsible for embedding the
negative attitude” (p. 16).
In context of the Diathesis-Stress model, negative life events represent the priming
procedure that activates a depressive self-schema in cognitively vulnerable individuals.
Segal and Ingram (1994) incorporate the issue of importance by stating that these adverse
life events will activate cognitive vulnerabilities if they are directly tied to a domain that
is important to a persons’ sense of self-worth. Latency can explain why there are no
observable differences in cognitive vulnerabilities between remitted depressives and
never depressed individuals if they are tested while not experiencing some significant life
stress.
Although Coyne and Gotlib (1986) further criticized the notion of latent processes
on the grounds that it “is reducing the possible points of contact between cognitive
formulations and empirical data” (p. 697), subsequent research has supported the
inclusion of activation procedures for testing cognitive formulations of depression
(Kelvin et al., 1999; Teasdale & Dent, 1987; Williams, 1988; unpublished doctoral
thesis). Teasdale and Dent (1987) report that, after exposure to a negative mood
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induction, a priming procedure which involved reading a series of negatively toned
statements about the self, remitted depressives recalled more negative adjectives rated as
self-descriptive compared to women with no history of depression. This finding suggests
activation of a depressive self-schema in the remitted depressive participants.
Williams’ (1988) prospective study is another early example of research using a
priming methodology before examining the predictive validity of cognitive
vulnerabilities. Student participants were induced into either a negative or positive mood
and then asked to recall positive and negative self-descriptive adjectives. Differential
recall for negative and positive adjectives in the neutral condition did not predict
depressive episodes during a one-year follow-up, however, participants who recalled
more negative than positive self-referent adjectives in the negative mood condition
experienced more significant episodes of depression. These results support the existence
of a depressive self-schema, which, if measured after activation, represents a
vulnerability for depression.
Gotlib (Gotlib & Krasnoperova, 1998) appears to have recently recanted his earlier
criticism of latent cognitive structures by stating, “based on the results of recent priming
studies, we argue further that some aspects of cognitive functioning, particularly those
involving memory processes, may indeed represent vulnerability factors for depression”
(p. 603). Segal and Ingram (1994) provide direction for future research by suggesting that
“the key to assessment of cognitive vulnerability is to study the activation of negative
self-referent cognitive structures” (p. 665).
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Focus on Specific Stressors
Critics also argue that, although cognitive theories of depression incorporate the role
of environmental stressors in discussions about the etiology of depression, early
researchers treated the effects of stressful life events in an undifferentiated manner
(Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Stoppard, 1989). Coyne and Gotlib (1983) argue that cognitive
research has been limited by a failure to examine how specific types of life stress are
related to depression. Segal (1988) has also commented on the necessity of further
refining the interaction between cognitive vulnerabilities and specific life stressors in
cognitive formulations of depression.
Schemas may be potentially reactive in the face of triggering events or specific
triggers. A model capable of testing this formulation would need not only to identify the
individuals who might be characterized by this type of cognitive bias but also to specify
the nature of the triggering events or circumstances that would activate it (p. 151).
Hammen (1985) had previously answered these valid criticisms by explicitly
integrating evaluation of stressful events. Hammen, Marks, Mayol and deMayo (1985)
were the first to test the hypothesized interaction between cognitive vulnerabilities and
stressful life event characteristics. The significance of this approach is apparent in light
of their finding that cognitive vulnerability variables, although measured without any
priming procedures, were predictive of future episodes of depression. This relationship,
however, only emerged after matching depressive self-schemas with schema-congruent
negative life events. The importance of examining life stress is made salient by a recent
analysis of the Canadian National Population Health Survey, conducted in 1994-1995
(Stephens, Oulberg, & Joubert, 1999). Individuals who reported high, versus low, levels
of stress were three times more likely to suffer from depressive symptoms and also
reported lower levels of self-esteem.
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Sociotropv and Autonomy
Rector, Segal and Gemar’s (1998) review of schema research in depression discusses
the need for investigation of specific life events that may trigger depression, and they
offer further support for the multi-dimensional structure of self. Their summary of
schema research supports Beck’s (1983, 1987) division of the depressive schema
construct into two major dimensions; sociotropy and autonomy. This conceptual division
is particularly evident in research that employs self-report inventories to assess
depressive schemata (Cane, Olinger, Gotlib, & Kuiper, 1986; Clark, Steer, Beck, & Ross,
1995). Beck (1983) initially discussed these two subtypes as dimensions of personality.
Sociotropic, or socially dependent, people are typified by there; need to seek closeness
and reassurance, desire for stable relationships, and a fear of disappointing, or being
rejected by, others. Any loss of an interpersonal relationship is closely connected to the
self-esteem of these individuals (Coyne & Whiffen, 1995).
The self-esteem of autonomous individuals, however, is principally derived from
their sense of self-efficacy, and their ability to achieve their goals. They are concerned
with individuality, and are typified by; an intemalized set of standards, goals, criteria for
achievement, and highly specific self-rewards. They often desire a freedom to initiate
their own aetions, disliking extemally imposed directives, and tends to judge self-worth
by success in fulfilling specific role expectations. Other characteristics of the autonomous
personality include being less susceptible to extemal feedback, which likely overlaps
with their lack of sensitivity to the needs of others (Beck, 1983).
This last autonomy descriptor, which downplays the importance of monitoring
interpersonal relationships for autonomous individuals, would appear to reflect a
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contradictory nature between these two personality dimensions. Although Beck (1983)
argued for the existence of “pure cases” (p. 272) - representing a heavy predominance for
one of these domains

he also theorized that individuals can shift between their

sociotropic and autonomous tendencies, depending upon the environmental context. In
essence, Beck (1983) was setting the stage for later schema-congruency theorizing.
A strict typological approach involving mutual exclusivity of sociotropy and
autonomy dimensions has also been challenged by Coyne and Whiffen (1995), who
review research suggesting that individuals reporting high levels of both sociotropy and
autonomy are; clinically depressed more often (Klein, Harding, Taylor, & Dickstein,
1988), experience higher levels of depression (Blatt, Guinlan, Chevron, McDonald, & n. They

conclude their review by questioning “whether they (sociotropy and autonomy) should be
considered distinct characteristics rather than facets of a more basic personality
characteristic” (p. 362, italics added).
Despite evidence suggesting that sociotropy and autonomy are not entirely
independent constructs, researchers continue to investigate the congruency hypothesis;
which predicts that specific cognitive vulnerabilities will interact with specific life events
(see Dozois & Backs-Dermott, 2000, for a review). A consistent finding in this area of
study is that measures of sociotropy successfully predict negative reactions to
interpersonal difficulties, yet the autonomy construct often lacks predictive utility for
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responses to achievement dilemmas. Dozois and Backs-Dermott (2000) propose that this
discrepancy may be associated with convergent validity concems among measures used
to assess autonomy, which are not present for measures of sociotropy. Despite the current
difficulties to uncover a predictive link for autonomy, the conceptualization of depressive
schemata with distinct content domains (i.e., achievement and interpersonal) allows for
more refined investigation of the interaction between specific personal events (i.e.,
failure, loss of relationships) and the onset of depression.
A Call for Ecologically Valid Experiments
Another topic argued to require refinement within cognitive research on depression
is the use of appropriate experimental stimuli that better approximate the way self
referent information is stored in semantic memory (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Segal, 1988).
The adequacy of trait adjectives, varying in personal descriptiveness, as representative
measures of self-schemas has been questioned. Although studies employing trait
adjectives have been lauded for their experimental control, they have also been criticized
for lacking relevance to real world issues (Neisser, 1976). To address this area of
concem, critics have called for experimental methods that better capture the process of
personal evaluation outside the laboratory (Safran, Segal, Hill, & Whiffen, 1990; Segal,
1988).
Clarifying Gender Differences in Depression Rates
Finally, Stoppard (1989) has argued that cognitive theories of depression are
inherently flawed for they do not account for the higher rates of depression observed
among women. This criticism focuses specifically on the failure to find gender
differences on measures of cognitive vulnerabilities (Dobson & Breiter, 1983; Oliver &

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26

Baumgart, 1983), or the antithetic findings that males hold greater cognitive
vulnerabilities (Gotlib, 1984; Wise & Bames, 1986). Numerous theorists of varied
backgrounds have responded to this criticism (Costello, 1989; Dobson, 1989; Gotlib,
1989; Pyke & Toukmanian; Hammen, 1989; Moretti & Meichenbaum, 1989; Nezu &
Nezu, 1989; Olinger, 1989; Shaw, 1989). The main rejoinders to Stoppard’s criticism
involved reviews of the literature that suggested, (a) greater cognitive vulnerabilities in
women (Gotlib, 1989), (b) discussion of the lack of sex differences in depression rates
among college students, which represent the majority of experimental samples reviewed
by Stoppard (Hammen, 1989; Morettie & Meichenbaum, 1989), and (c) an
acknowledgement of the potential causal heterogeneity of depression (Costello, 1989).
Olinger (1989) also advanced the argument that a lack of sex differences in cognitive
vulnerabilities does not necessarily invalidate the Diathesis-Stress model if you accept
the proposition that women may experience more life stress. The more recent emphasis
on the necessity of activating latent cognitive vulnerabilities represents an additional
explanation for the discrepancy between gender depression rates and levels of cognitive
vulnerabilities. Perhaps women are more cognitively predisposed to experience
depression, but these vulnerabilities must first be primed before sex differences emerge.
Measures of Cognitive Vulnerability
Researchers have developed a number of measures to assess the various cognitive
vulnerabilities proposed by theorists. The Attributional Styles Questionnaire (ASQ;
Peterson, Semmel, Von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982) was based on
the reformulated leamed helplessness theory of depression and examines the causal
explanations individuals make for negative events. The Cognitive Bias Questionnaire
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(CBQ; Hammen, 1981) draws upon Beck’s theories (1967, 1976) to measure cognitive
distortions such as the tendency to overgeneralize the implications of unpleasant events
and the tendency to make inferences without considering alternative points of view. The
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978) also tests postulates from
Beck’s cognitive distortion theory related to making erroneous inferences, attending to
negative stimuli, and overgeneralizing from negative events. Janoff-Bulman (1979)
created a measure that taps into behavioral self-blame, which involves self-criticism of
behavior, as well as characterological self-blame, which involves self-criticism related to
the type of person one is. Janoff-Bulman’s research (1979) suggests that depressed
people engage in higher levels of characterological self-blame, but they do not differ
from non-depressed people on the behavioral self-blame variable. Carver and Ganellen’s
Attitude Towards Self Scale (ATS; 1983) also assesses self-punitiveness through
measurement of high standards, self-criticism, and overgeneralization.
The overgeneralization construct represents a common cognitive process associated
with depression. Carver, Ganellen, and Behar-Mitrani (1985) argue that although the
Attributional Style Questionnaire, Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, and the Attitudes
Towards Self scale offer differing theoretical antecedents, they all contain elements or
subscales that reflect a tendency to look at a specific bad outcome and infer an overall
lack of self-worth. Overgeneralization has been offered as a mechanism that explains the
interaction between self-esteem and depression, and further articulation of the construct is
warranted. Considerable evidence indicates that depressed individuals, as well as those
with low self-esteem, tend to exhibit a selective bias to overgeneralize the implications of
unfavorable outcomes towards the self (Carver & Ganallen, 1983; Carver et al., 1985;
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Kemis et al., 1989). Recall that this psychological process is incorporated as a potential
diathesis in Beck’s earliest writings (1967); he postulates that the depressed person’s
sense of failure spreads “from the particular trait to the totality of his self-concept” (p.
115).
There also appears to be a close connection between the definitions of
overgeneralization and depressive self-schemas. Carver, Ganellen, and Behar-Mitrani
(1985) have defined overgeneralization as “the degree to which bad outcomes engage a
tendency to bring thoughts of personal inadequacy to mind and/or experience a reduction
in the sense of self-worth” (p. 727). A reiteration of the depressive self-schema definition,
“a cognitive structure comprised of self-descriptive traits or attributes which are
represented in an organized or clustered fashion in semantic memory, such that activation
or exposure to one attribute will automatically lead to activation of the others” (Segal &
Vella, 1990; p. 162), suggests that the cognitive process of overgeneralization is akin to
activating the cognitive structure contained within depressive self-schemas.
Research on Overgeneralization Measures
Considerable research supports the validity of the overgeneralization subscale, from
the Attitudes Towards Self Scale, as a robust measure, which is both correlated with, and
predictive of, depression (Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Carver, Ganellen, & Behar-Mitrani,
1985; Carver, La Voie, Kuhl, & Ganellen, 1988; Edelman, Ahrens, & Haaga, 1994; Flett,
Hewitt, & Mittelstaedt, 1991; Ganellen, 1988; Kemis, Brockner, & Frankel, 1989).
Furthermore, research using other measures of overgeneralization has shown that this
constmct can account for significant variance in depressive symptomatology (Fpstein,
1992). Carver and Ganellen (1983) report that the overgeneralization subscale from the
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ATS accounted for 17.5% of the variance in Beck Depression Inventory scores (EDI;
Beck, 1967) amongst both male and female college students. However, the other
subscales of the Attitudes Towards Self scale, measuring self-criticism and high
standards, did not account for substantive variance. Carver and colleagues (1985) later
demonstrated through partial correlation analyses that the overgeneralization subscale of
the Attitudes Towards Self scale was a better predictor of Beck Depression Inventory
scores than the Cognitive Bias Questionnaire, Attributional Style Questionnaire, and the
Janoff-Bulman measure of characterological self-blame.
Ganellen (1988) reexamined the predictive validity of the ATS Overgeneralization
subscale and the Attributional Style Questionnaire for depression scores measured by the
Hamilton Rating Scales for Depression (HRSD; Hamiltion, 1960). Results confirmed
earlier research indicating that the Overgeneralization subscale was a more robust
predictor of depression than attributional style. Furthermore, the Overgeneralization
subscale demonstrated specificity for depression, and was not correlated with anxiety,
whereas the Attributional Style Questionnaire tended to covary with both depression and
anxiety. This finding answers the criticism of Coyne and Gotlib (1983), who argued that
specificity to depression had not been demonstrated consistently for any measure of
cognitive bias or distortion. These results suggested that the process of self-evaluation
following negative life stress might be more relevant to depression, compared to the
explanations related to the causes of such events.
Edelman, Ahrens, and Haaga (1994) also cite evidence from a prospective study
supporting the superior validity of the ATS overgeneralization subscale, relative to the
Attributional Style Quesionnaire. Stable, global attributions for positive events tended to
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predict recovery in a 3-week follow-up assessment for individuals who were initially
dysphoric, inferring that positive self-descriptions from the occurrence of positive events
were associated with more subsequent remission in depressive symptoms.
Overgeneralization, however, predicted more subsequent depression, with high
overgeneralizers remaining more dysphoric at the 3-week follow-up than individuals who
did not overgeneralize. Of particular significance is the fact that this study focused on
exploring attributional styles and only included the ATS scale as an exploratory measure.
Epstein’s (1992) research included self-reference as a variable in a study that
examined generalizations from positive and negative events among groups of subjects
differing in general coping ability. Results indicated that groups differed only in response
to negative outcomes directed at the self (rather than others), with more negative
overgeneralization occurring among poor constructive thinkers. These findings further
supported the role of negative self-schemas; specifically the process of making negative
inferences about the self, for self-esteem and depression.
Priming Overgeneralization
Similar to the difficulties of establishing a depressive self-schema as a causal
determinant of low self-esteem and depression, early research suggested a concomitant
function for overgeneralization rather than a causal one. Using a cross-lag correlation
design, researchers (Carver et al., 1988) tested a unidirectional causal connection between
overgeneralization and depression but found no evidence for such a link. Contradictory
evidence is obtained in research reported by Edelman and colleagues (1994), who found a
causal link between overgeneralization tendencies and abatement/maintenance of
depressive symptoms.
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Reconciliation of these discrepant conclusions once again requires consideration of
the latency argument. Overgeneralization measurements in the latter study were
completed on dysphoric individuals suggesting that this cognitive vulnerability was in an
active, and therefore primed state. Participants in the Carver et al. (1988) study, however,
were non-depressed and no priming procedures were employed. Studies that account for
the interaction between cognition and environmental variables (i.e., life events) through
the use of priming procedures are argued to be more ecologically valid than paradigms
that do not prime self-schemas before testing (Safran et al., 1990).
Conceptual Framework Linking Self-esteem and Depression
How should one conceptualize the framework linking negative life events,
overgeneralization, self-esteem reactivity, and depression? To establish causality, both
overgeneralization and self-esteem reactivity must be shown to be temporally and
conceptually independent of depression. Roberts, Gotlib, and Kassel (1996) advance an
ordering of these variables by arguing that dysfunctional attitudes (cognitive
vulnerabilities) predispose people to lower levels of self-esteem. Subsequently, “depleted
levels of self-esteem then act as a more proximal cause of depressive symptoms” (p. 316317). This conception is supported by the realization that the majority of cognitive
models of depression incorporate, either implicitly or explicitly, the causal effect of self
esteem reactivity. Recall that negative biases (i.e., information processing associated with
depressive self-schemas and cognitive vulnerabilities) lead to decreases in self-esteem
through disparaging thoughts of personal competency (Kemis et al., 1998).
Do self-esteem fluctuations and overgeneralization represent moderating variables
between negative life events and development of depression? This would appear to
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depend upon the exact model and variables being investigated. Edelman and colleagues
(1994) indicated that overgeneralization moderated the remittance of depressive
symptoms among dysphoric individuals. Similarly, self-esteem fluctuations were shown
to moderate the impact of stressful life events on depression symptoms over a 6-week
prospective interval (Roberts & Gotlib, 1997). Both overgeneralization and low self
esteem were argued to play a mediating role, however, between adult attachment security
and depressive symptoms (Roberts, Gotlib, & Kassel, 1996). Adding to the confusion of
appropriate modeling is the consideration that two of these studies were conducted by the
same researchers. It is the current author’s opinion that, due to the complexity of
arguments surrounding potential ontological determinants of depression, it would be
somewhat simplistic to assume that a single causal mechanism results in depression.
Therefore, overgeneralization and self-esteem reactivity are best conceptualized as
moderating variables.
Another logical question pertinent to developing an appropriate model asks whether
self-esteem and overgeneralization represent redundant measures for predicting
depression. Kemis and colleagues (1998) employed a prospective experimental design to
examine the roles of self-esteem variability and overgeneralization (measured using the
Attitude Towards Self scale) in the context of daily life hassles and severity of depressive
symptoms. Results indicated that both of these variables accounted for independent
variance in depression. This observed lack of redundancy further supports the notion that
self-esteem and overgeneralization act as moderators within conceptual models of
depression.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33

Integration of various theories and research reviewed allows for the development of
a conceptual model that argues for a causal role of self-esteem reactivity in the
development of depression (refer to Figure 2). Negative life events that directly reference
a person’s sense of self function as stressors that interact with an individual’s tendency to
overgeneralize (cognitive process). This interaction activates latent, depressive self
schemata (cognitive structures) among people with a tendency to overgeneralize.
Depressive self-schemata then bias memory recall of important self-evaluations
(cognitive products), which is assessed as fluctuations in self-esteem (i.e., selfevaluations for self-concept domains considered important). These fluctuations
exacerbate and prolong negative affect and subsequently lead to depression. Individuals
who do not overgeneralize from negative events do not activate negative self-schemas
and are hypothesized to be somewhat protected from reactive self-esteem and depression.
Activation of Latent Cognitive Structures; Mood-state versus Cognitive-priming
Although there is sufficient agreement that depressive self-schemas must first be
activated before their effects are observed, disagreement currently exists over the specific
mechanism, mood or cognition, by which these latent cognitive structures are primed (see
Blaney, 1986 for a review; Brown & Taylor, 1986).
Bower’s Associative Network Model
Bower’s (1981) associative network model provides a framework for understanding
how thoughts and/or feelings could prime latent, depressive schemas. Bower proposes
that both cognitive and affective information is represented within semantic memory as a
network of tightly interconnected nodes. Spreading activation is hypothesized to occur
after the adjacent nodes become indirectly primed and activated due to their proximity to
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Figure 2. Conceptual framework for Diathesis-Stress model
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nodes that are directly targeted. Accordingly, nodes within this associative network that
are closely located, or have a history of being indirectly primed, are more likely to
respond to spreading activation in the future. Similar to neuronal pathways in the brain,
networks of connected nodes that are activated more frequently may become stronger and
more automatic, and, arguably, may have a lower threshold for activation. Thus,
depressive cognitive structures will likely become salient through their associative
relationship with negative cognitions and affect engendered by current, negative life
events (Segal & Ingram, 1994).
Disagreement exists amongst researchers on whether subjectively negative moodstates or negative cognitions activate the series of nodes within the associative network
that comprise the depressive self-schema. The mood-state hypothesis (Miranda & Gross,
1997; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998) predicts that because depressive schemas are likely to
develop in a negative emotional context, they should be linked to the associated
depressed mood within this memory network. Accordingly, derogatory self-evaluations
do not occur until cued by the reemergence of their associated mood-state. Negative
moods should trigger the activation of latent, depressive schemas, which in turn promote
instability of self-esteem and subsequent depression (Kelvin et al., 1999; Teasdale, 1988).
Bower’s (1981) early research supported the mood-state-dependent memory,
learning, and behaviour theory. The cognitive-priming perspective, however, posits that
MIPs that make reference to the self prime valenced cognitive structures independent of
their effects on mood (Slyker & McNally, 1991; Riskind, 1989) and it is the cognitive
aspect of the procedure that influences people’s self-evaluations (Blaney, 1986).
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Both cognition and emotion have been incorporated into conceptions of the self.
Although the majority of theorists and researchers favour a cognitive conception of the
self, some have recognized the role of affect, specifically tied to the process of evaluation
and self-esteem, in the structure and processes of the self-concept. Although James
(1890) did not directly discuss the role of emotion, he did view the self in terms of both a
cognitive and evaluative system. Cooley (1902) incorporated self-feeling as an important
component in his theory of self. Markus’s incorporation of self-schemas relies heavily on
the cognitive components of the self, yet she places the self-concept within a system of
affective-cognitive structures (Markus & Nurius, 1986).
Mood Induction Procedure Paradigm
Research examining mood-state and cognitive-priming theories often employ mood
induction procedures (MIPs), which are designed to create temporary mood states
analogous to naturally occurring moods (Martin, 1990). Initial support for the moodpriming perspective was obtained from studies in which memories that were affectively
congruent with an induced mood-state were also found to be more accessible (Snyder &
White, 1982; Teasdale & Taylor, 1981). These results are also interpretable within the
cognitive-priming perspective; MIPs used in these studies required participants to read
positive and negative statements directly targeting the self, which allowed participants
greater access to similarly toned memories.
To clarify the primacy of cognition or emotion, Rholes, Riskind and Lane (1987)
examined the factor of self-reference in MIP effects. Although somatic statements that
encouraged participants to adopt bodily sensations associated with depression were as
efficacious as self-devaluative statements for inducing a negative mood, access to
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emotional memories was only facilitated by the latter. Furthermore, the self-devaluative
statements were shown to promote access to these memories even when they failed to
decrease mood. Heatherton, Striepe, and Wittenberg (1998) developed an alternative
methodology to investigate the role of self-reference in MIP effects. Their MIPs required
dieters to either focus on themselves (self-referent) or another person (other-referent) as
the cause of a positive or neutral event. These researchers report that only the negative,
self-referent MIP resulted in disruption of participants’ dietary restraint.
The current author adapted this MIP methodology from previous research (Taylor,
1999) that investigated body image esteem, which can be conceptualized as a specific
domain of self-concept. Participants exposed to a positive, self-referent MIP failed to
report a mood change, yet their body esteem improved, suggesting support for the
cognitive-priming hypothesis over mood-state. This trend was also supported for the
negative MIPs; although the negative self-referent and other-referent MIPs both produced
significant decreases in affect, women in the self-referent condition reported more
derogatory body esteem, whereas women in the other-referent MIP unexpectedly
reported improvement in body esteem. These results demonstrate that mood can be
incongruent with self-evaluation. Safran et al., (1990) explain that the mood versus
cognition controversy is still debated in the literature, arguing that “the question as to
whether schematic processing differences merely reflect the effects of mood, rather than
the operation of a cognitive structure, has yet to be conclusively resolved” (p. 145).
Central versus Peripheral Self-concept
Sedikides (1995) further examined the emotion versus cognition primacy issue by
incorporating Kelly’s (1955) notion of core and peripheral descriptions of self. According
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to Sedikides differential sensitivity hypothesis, central and peripheral^ self-conceptions
are differentially influenced by mood. Peripheral self-conceptions are modified in a
mood-congruent manner because they are less elaborated and less certain, whereas
central self-conceptions are unaffected by mood because they are more elaborated and
certain. Sedikides (1995) research supports the differential sensitivity hypothesis because
peripheral self-conceptions (behavior and trait self-descriptive adjectives rated as
irrelevant to the self) showed a congruency with induced happy and sad mood-states.
Central self-conceptions (behavior and trait self-descriptive adjectives rated as personally
relevant to the self) however, showed stability and lack of change related to mood.
The issue of self-reference becomes salient for placing these results in context, for
Sedikides employed a story MIP that focused on an extemal other. This other-referent
MIP was used for the explicitly stated purpose of avoiding the possibility of confounding
between the effects of mood and the potential impact of cognition related to the self.
Would the differential sensitivity hypothesis hold for MIPs that target the self, as opposed
to an extemal other? The significance of this question is illustrated by the research of
Hoh, McLennan, and Ho (1987) who studied attributional styles and their correlation to
depressive symptoms. Although only the intemality attribution was predictive of
depression scores, the importance that participants assigned to the bad events of the
Attributional Style Questionnaire was also significant. Researchers interpreted this
finding as support for a depressive self-schema in that subjects’ depression scores were
significantly related to their tendency to view potential negative events as having greater
self-referent importance.

^ Sedikides (1995) defines central self-conceptions as high in personal descriptiveness and importance,
whereas peripheral self-conceptions are low in personal descriptiveness and importance.
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Demand Characteristics
A limitation inherent to the majority of experimental research is the issue of
demand characteristics (Ome, 1962). This concern is heightened for investigations
employing an MIP paradigm (Polivy & Doyle, 1980), as well as the use of self-report
measures. With respect to MIPs that use emotionally toned self-statements, critics have
argued that genuine mood induction may not occur and participants are simply reporting
mood change to comply with experimental demands (Polivy & Doyle, 1980).
Polivy and Doyle (1980) examined the inherent demand effects associated with
Velten’s (1968) original mood induction procedure instructions to “try and feel the mood
suggested by” the self-referent statements. These researchers included counter-demand
groups with participants who were instructed that they could expect to feel the opposite
mood suggested by the self statements. Although the participants in these counter
demand groups did not experience any significant mood shift, suggesting that demand
effects have an impact on participant responses, Polivy and Doyle conclude that demand
characteristics contribute to genuine mood changes.
The potential confound of demand characteristics also apply to story MIPs that
encourage participants to allow themselves to feel the mood associated with the story.
Evidence refuting the demand-effects proposal is the observation of mood effects that
participants are unlikely to spontaneously produce (Martin, 1990). For example,
differences in conjugate eye movements between negative and positive self-statement
MIP groups have been observed (Natale & Gur, 1980). The speed of psychomotor tasks
offers further evidence for genuine mood shifts, for participants have shown a decrease in
number-writing tasks after exposure to a negative self-statement MIP, compared to an
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increase in task speed after a positive self-statement MIP (Alloy, Abramson, & Viscusi,
1981).
The argument that only demand characteristics account for MIP effects is
particularly weak for recall experiments (Martin, 1990), which represent a substantial
proportion of the research reviewed here. Demand effects can not explain why
participants who recalled more depressive self-descriptive adjectives than positive ones
after a negative MIP were more likely to later experience depression (Williams, 1988).
Demand effects also do not explain the complex interaction of core and peripheral self
descriptions with mood (Sedikides, 1995). Although evidence suggests that MIPs
produce genuine shifts in mood, this finding does not negate the possibility that demand
characteristics do operate within these experiments. The most common solution advanced
by researchers (Poloivy & Doyle, 1980; Westermann et ah, 1996) is to include a postexperimental questionnaire to determine if participants understood the purpose of the
experiment, and whether they acted in a genuine fashion or were attempting to behave
like “good participants”. Suspicious participants can then be excluded from data analysis.
Social Comparison Theory
Explanations for the unexpected improvement in body esteem observed after
exposure to a negative, other-focused MIP (Taylor, 1999) relied on social comparison
theory (Festinger, 1954). The majority of social comparison research conducted in the
area of depression examines how depressed individuals tend to make less favorable
comparisons during personal performance appraisals and self-evaluations (Ahrens, 1991;
Brewin & Fumham, 1986; Campbell, 1986). Flett, Hewitt, & Mittelstaedt (1991 p. 214)
argue that this tendency to perceive negative social comparison outcomes represents
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another form of self-punitiveness. However, there may be a more benign element to
social comparison, in that researchers have also argued that downward social
comparisons (comparing oneself to those doing worse than the self) may have self
enhancing effects that positively influence self-evaluations (Aspinwall, & Taylor, 1993;
Buunk, Collins, Talor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990). Accordingly, the body image
attitudes of participants in the Taylor (1999) study may have improved due to downward
comparisons with the character in the negative, other-referent MIP, who had been badly
burned in a car accident. The fact that body image is consistently rated as the most
important self-concept domain among young adult females (Marsh, 1986) suggests that
this construct represents a central domain of self. Would these social comparison trends
emerge for self-evaluations in peripheral domains of self-concept?
The relationship between self-esteem and social comparisons represents another area
of controversy. Some theorists (Wills, 1981) argue that individuals with low self-esteem
are more likely to be self-serving in their use of social comparisons. Other investigators
(Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987) however, hypothesize that people
with high self-esteem are more likely to engage in self-enhancing comparisons. Empirical
research (Buunk et al., 1990) appears to support the latter argument, for individuals with
low self-esteem were more likely to perceive both downward and upward comparisons as
having negative implications for the self. Again, would self-esteem differences in social
comparisons be moderated by the importance ascribed to the self-concept domains being
compared?
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Rationale and Overview for the Current Study
The main postulate of the Diathesis-Stress model contends that depression is
produced by the interaction between cognitive vulnerabilities and the experience of
stressful life events that are linked to the person’s self-worth (Alloy et al., 1997).
Individuals at risk for depression are said to hold maladaptive cognitive structures
(depressive self-schema) which, when activated by negative life events, lead to the
development of depressive symptoms through their influence on preferential encoding
and retrieval of negative self-referent information (Alloy et al., 1997). The specific
mechanisms that lead to the activation of depressive self-schemas (mood vs. cognition),
the moderating role of cognitive vulnerabilities used to assess these schemas, and the
moderating effect of importance of self-concept domains on self-esteem reactivity,
represent current areas of dispute for the Diathesis-Stress model of depression. The
specific purpose of the present study was to determine whether self-reference,
overgeneralization, and the importance ascribed to self-concept domains, influence self
esteem reactivity to MIPs.
To examine these issues, participants’ self-evaluations for various self-concept
domains were measured before (pre-test) and after (post-test) exposure to one of four
mood induction procedures (MIPs) that varied in both mood tone (positive vs. negative)
and degree of self-reference (self-referent vs. other-referent).
Hypotheses
1.

Differences in self-evaluation changes for the various self-concept domains, from preMIP to post-MIP, were hypothesized to occur across the four MIP conditions and will be
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moderated by the importance ratings ascribed to them. These changes are based on the
following rationale;
a)

Self-evaluations in self-concept domains rated as important signify central
characteristics of the self, and therefore are directly related to self-esteem. Derived from
the cognitive-priming perspective, central self-evaluations were expected to decrease
after the negative, self-referent MIP, which was designed to hold direct implications for
an individuals’ sense of self.
Conversely, since the negative, other-referent MIP was designed to avoid self
focused attention, central self-evaluations were not expected to decrease after this
condition. Rather, based on social comparison theory and earlier research by Taylor
(1999), who found body-image esteem improved among women exposed to a similar
negative, other-referent MIP, central self-evaluations in the current study were expected
to improve after the negative-other MIP.

b)

Self-evaluations in self-concept domains rated as unimportant signify peripheral
characteristics of the self and are unrelated to self-esteem. These unimportant self
domains can be understood to exist outside one’s sense of self. Accordingly, mood cues
alone will influence the self-evaluation process, rather than primed self-schemata. As
such, peripheral self-evaluations were expected to decrease after both negative MIP
conditions, and to increase after both positive MIP conditions, consistent with the moodstate theory.

c)

Based on previous findings of asymmetric effects in self-esteem fluctuations
associated with success and failure MIPs, it was predicted that observed changes in self
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evaluations would be more pronounced for the negative MIP conditions compared to the
positive MIP conditions.
2.

The cognitive vulnerability of overgeneralization was expected to moderate observed
changes, with high overgeneralizers showing greater decreases in central self-evaluations
after exposure to the negative, self-referent MIP. Since this MIP involves reading
negatively toned self-statements, it was predicted that individuals with a tendency to
ruminate on personal failures would be more affected, and demonstrate larger selfevaluation decreases across their important domains of self.
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
Participants
Participants were recruited through the University of Windsor undergraduate
psychology participant pool and received partial course credit for their participation. An
undergraduate population within an 18-24 age range was deemed appropriate because the
identity of these students is in a process of change (Marsh, 1986). Thus, their selfevaluations may be more prone to fluctuate in response to the mood induction procedures
(MIPs). All participants provided “informed” written consent prior to completing the
pretest/screening and the experimental phases, and they were treated in accordance with
ethical principles for research with human subjects.
Participants were seen on two occasions, during the pretest-screening phase and
again 7-14 days later during the experimental phase. During the pretest/screening phase,
212 participants completed the package of questionnaires; 155 (73%) were female. Two
of these participants were excluded from completing the experimental phase because
their age fell outside the 18 - 24 yr-old inclusion range. Nine males and nine females (8%
of pretest/ screening sample) reported high levels of depressive symptoms (scores greater
than 22 on the Beck Depression Inventory-II [Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996]) at the
pretest/screening phase and were excluded from the experimental phase. Although BDIII scores of 20 and greater are typically representative of elevated depressive symptoms,
due to concerns of obtaining a significant sample size to appropriately test hypotheses, a
slightly higher cut-off score was employed for the present study.
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Elevated depression scores were treated as an exclusionary criterion for three
reasons. First, it would be unethical to expose currently depressed individuals to a
negative mood induction procedure. Second, currently depressed individuals will be
excluded to minimize potential confounding effects of clinical depression on measures of
self-concept, self-esteem and efficacy of the MIPs. This exclusionary rationale has been
followed in past depressogenic schema research (Kelvin et al., 1999). Roberts and Gotlib
(1996), who also examined self-esteem reactivity in non-depressed individuals, cogently
argue for the validity of using this homogenous sample, “Because we have opted for a
sample based on low depression scores there should be reduced variance in the
depression levels and, therefore, this study will provide a conservative test of our
hypotheses and any positive findings will testify to the potential strength of our model”
(p. 522). Third, researchers (Roberts & Monroe, 1992) have argued that the effects of
variability in self-esteem are more pronounced in non-depressed individuals.
Eleven participants failed to retum to complete the experimental phase, and data
from two participants who did retum were discarded due to deviation from experimental
procedures. Of the 179 participants who correctly completed the experimental phase, 128
(72%) were female. Mean age of participants completing the experimental phase was
20.7 years (SD = 1.5), and the mean depression score was 8.9 (SD = 5.7).
Experimental Design
This study used a 2 x 2 (between-subj ects) x 2 (within-subjects) mixed factorial
design with one covariate (depression). The first independent between-subj ects variable,
mood (positive vs. negative), was crossed with the second between-subj ects variable,
referent (self vs. other) to produce four groups that represent the four mood induction
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procedures (MIPs); positive-self, positive-other, negative-self, and negative-other. Time
(pretest vs. posttest) represents the within-subjects independent variable. Figure 3 shows
the four experimental conditions and their respective sample sizes split by sex at posttest.
Group Assignment
The experimental phase involved random assignment of participants, using random
number tables, to one of four experimental MIP conditions, with the constraint of equal
proportions of males and females in each condition.
Measures
Beck Depression Inventory- II (BDI-II)
The BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) was included as a screening measure to
exclude individuals reporting elevated depressive symptoms from completing the
experimental manipulation. The BDI-II has well established internal consistency,
Cronbach’s alpha “r”=.84, and good test-retest reliabilities (.60-.83). Concurrent and
construct validity of the BDI-II with other measures of depression have also been
reported (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988; Dozois & Dobson, 2001).
Attitudes Toward Self Scale (ATS) - Overgeneralization Subscale
The Overgeneralization subscale of the Attitude Towards Self Scale (Carver &
Ganellen, 1983; see Appendix A) was included as a continuous independent variable that
could be dichotomized into high and low categories. This subscale contains 7 items that
measure the tendency for negative outcomes to activate other feelings of personal
inadequacy in domains that may be unrelated to the initial stressor (e.g., “My feelings
about myself drop if I notice any weaknesses or shortcomings”). Items are rated on a 7point Likert-type scale (I very strongly agree to I very strongly disagree). Carver et al..
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Figure 3. Four experimental mood induction procedures
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(1985) report a test-retest correlation of .65 for the overgeneralization subscale (6week interval). Carver and Ganellen (1983) report an internal consistency of .80 for this
subscale. The subscale’s validity is supported by its significant associations (“r” ranging
from .36 to .64) with the BDI across varied samples (Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Edelman
et al., 1994; Flett, Hewitt, & Mittelstaedt, 1991; Kemis et al., 1989). Ganellen (1988)
investigated the discriminant validity of this subscale and reported that it is specifically
associated with depression, but not anxiety.
Visual Analogue Scales (VAS)
Participants reported their current mood-state by rating the adjectives “happy” and
“sad” on a scale anchored at 0 mm, {not at all), and 100 mm, {extremely). Six filler
items, depicting other mood-states, were included to reduce demand characteristics
associated with this manipulation check. The validity of visual analogue scales (VAS,
see Appendix B) for assessing mood change has been established in previous studies (see
Martin, 1990, for a review).
Depressive Adjectives Checklist (DACL)
The DACL, forms A and B (see Appendices C and D, respectively), was used as a
mood manipulation check to assess the efficacy of the four MIP conditions for altering
mood. In a meta-analysis study of mood induction research, reviewers concluded that the
DACL was an effective method for measuring both negative and positive transient moodstates (Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). This measure has shown good
reliability with split-half correlations of “r”= .89 and “r”=.91 for forms A and B
respectively (Lubin, 1965). These measures have also shown concurrent validity with
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BDI scores drawn from a clinical sample; “r”=.59 for Form A and “r” = .47 for Form B
(Lubin, 1965). Forms A and B are highly intercorrelated at “r” = .89.
Self Description Questionnaire - III (SDQ-III)
The Self Description Questionnaire-Ill (Marsh, 1989; see Appendix E) is designed to
measure multiple dimensions of self-concept in university students and other adults. The
SDQ-III is composed of 136 self-report items that are structured on an 8-point Likerttype response format. The items comprise 13 subscales: eight non-academic subscales
(Peer Relations - Same Sex, Peer Relations - Opposite Sex, Parent Relations, Physical
Ability, Physical Appearance, Emotional Stability, Honesty/trust, and Spiritual
Values/Religion); four academic subscales (Verbal, Mathematics, Problem Solving, and
General - Academic); and one global measure of self-concept (General-Self).
This self-concept measure was selected for three reasons. First, the
multidimensional model of self-concept, upon which the SDQ-III is based, has received
strong empirical support (Byme, 1996 for a review; Harter, 1996). Second, previous
research (Marsh, Richards, & Bames, 1986) has examined stability coefficients, which
are correlations between responses to the self-concept subscales by the same individual at
two points in time. Stability coefficients for SDQ-III subscales, assessed before and after
a month-long intensive intervention program designed to enhance self-concept/self
esteem in late adolescents, ranged from “r” = .74-.9S, with a mean “r” = .85. This
normative data provides a reference for inferring clinically significant change in selfconcept domains. Third, extensive research across varied samples supports the reliability,
validity and generalizability of the measure. Internal consistencies for the subscales are
good (.76 to .95) with a mean Cronbach’s alpha over the 13 subscales of .90 (Marsh,
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1992). The measure has good test-retest reliability (mean subscale “r” = .87) over a onemonth interval (Marsh, 1986). Application of a multitrait-multimethod approach offers
support for both convergent and discriminant validity of the SDQ-III (Marsh & Byme,
1993). The factor stracture of the SDQ-III has been validated by confirmatory factor
analysis and, importantly for the present study, this factor stmcture is invariant across
gender (Byme, 1988; Marsh, 1989). The SDQ-III also requires individuals to rate the
personal importance of their self-concept domains (see Appendix F).
Procedure
Participants were tested in groups during the pretest/screening phase. After
completing consent form A (see Appendix G), followed by the VAS, the participants
filled out the ATS Overgeneralization subscale and SDQ-III in counterbalanced order.
The BDI -II was completed last by all participants. After completion of the
questionnaires, participants scoring below 22 on the BDI were asked to sign up for a
supposedly unrelated study being conducted by the research assistant 7-14 days later.
This deception was deemed necessary to ensure that participants who were later assigned
to the other-referent MIPs would not enter the experimental phase thinking that they
might be asked about their self-concept, which could inadvertently prime their self
schema.
During the experimental phase, participants were tested individually. Participants
were met by the present author who followed a scripted introduction (see Appendix H).
After being seated in a comfortable, reclining chair in a small office with soft lighting,
the researcher asked participants to review and fill out consent form B (see Appendix I).
Participants were then instmcted to fill out the DACL (Form A) and read instmctions for
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their respective MIP (after the researcher had left). Immediately following the MIP,
participants completed the DACL (Form B), followed by the same package of
questionnaires completed at pretest: VAS, ATS Overgeneralization subscale, and SDQ111. The experimental manipulation lasted approximately 30 minutes on average.
After completing the experiment, participants were brought to another room to fill
out the posttest questionnaire (see Appendix J), which inquired about suspected purposes
of the study. All participants were then debriefed about the purpose of the experiment and
the necessity of using deception was discussed. Finally, participants exposed to the
negative MIPs underwent the positive, self-referent M l? to counteract any negative
affect, and they were also provided with a distress center contact number.
Experimental Manipulations: Mood Induction Procedures
Participants were asked to read either a series of positive or negative personal (self
referent) statements or an illustrated story (other-referent) with either a positive or
negative tone. The two negative MIPs (negative-self and negative-other) have been
shown to produce effective mood changes in previous research (Taylor, et al., 1999).
However, in the Taylor (1999) study, the positive MIPs were not effective in changing
mood. In an effort to increase the efficacy of the MIPs for the current study, music
selected to facilitate participants’ induction into a negative or positive mood was played
throughout the entire experiment. A combined music and story MIP has been found to
effectively induce both negative and positive mood changes (Mayer et al., 1990).
Reviewers of mood induction research, based on obtained effect sizes of MIP
manipulations, indicate equivalent lability to mood change across sex, cognitive
vulnerability levels, and self-esteem (Kelvin et al., 1999; Lewis & Harder, 1988;
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Westermann et al., 1996). The lack of differential responding to the MIPs across
participant characteristics has implications for the current study, for replication of these
trends allows for clearer inferences to be made in regard to self-evaluation changes,
without the confound of mood change being correlated with independent variables.
Self-referent Mood Induction Procedures: Positive and Negative
A verbal self-referencing procedure developed by Seibert and Ellis (I99I) was used
to induce positive and negative affect (see Appendices K and L for positive and negative
statements, respectively). This method has been shown be a valid means of inducing
happy and sad mood-states as assessed by the DACL and visual analogue scales
(Teasdale & Fogarty, 1989). The procedure follows from Velten's (1968) empirically
supported MIP (see Martin, 1990, for a review) but modernizes the language for typical
college undergraduates. A series of 25 statements were printed on individual pages in a
booklet (e.g., I know if I try I can make things tum out fine, I wish I could be myself, but
nobody likes me when I am). Participants were instructed to read aloud the statements
and focus on their personal meanings, as well as allow themselves to experience any
mood changes. Tape recorded instructions informed participants, at 20 second intervals,
to read the next statement in the series. Participants are instructed not to resist the mood
influences of the statements but attempt to experience them fully (see Appendix M).
There are no references to somatic states, which heightens the focus on statements that
reference the self-concept.
Other-referent Mood Induction Procedures
The other-referent mood inductions are based on a story MIP developed by
Sedikides (1995). These procedures involve an other-directed, outward attentional focus.
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This other-directed focus requires participants to think about another person as the target
of an event. Outward attentional focus refers to thinking about another person’s thoughts
and feelings (Carlson & Miller, 1987). Sedikides (1995) states that this MIP was
developed to avoid increasing attentional focus on the self. According to cognitivepriming theory, this MIP should not activate one’s depressive self-schema. Instructions
for the other-referent MIPs are listed in Appendix N.
Positive-other
Participants were induced into a positive mood-state by first imagining that a friend
of the opposite sex had won $100,000 in a lottery. They then imagined for two minutes
how their friend would think and feel and were provided with a ticket stub of a lottery
ticket to assist them in their imagination. Participants wrote about their friend’s thoughts
and feelings for an additional three minutes. Participants were told to imagine for two
minutes that this friend took a trip to Hawaii to celebrate. Participants were given scenic
pictures to aid them in their imagery. They then spent three minutes writing about the
friend's thoughts and feelings when on the vacation in Hawaii.
Negative-other
Participants were induced into a sad mood-state by first imagining that a friend of
the opposite sex was burned in a fire and was in critical condition. They then imagined
for two minutes how their friend would feel and think and were provided with
photographs of bum victims to assist them in their imagination. Participants then spent
three minutes writing about their friend’s feelings and thoughts. Next, participants
imagined for two minutes that their friend succumbed to the injuries and died.
Participants were shown a picture of a funeral scene. Finally, participants wrote for three
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minutes about the feelings and thoughts that the friends’ parents would experience at the
funeral. The procedure focused on the friends’ parents in order to avoid personal
implications/references for participants.
Music Selections
The music selections were based on two meta-analyses of past MIP research that
demonstrate the consistent effectiveness of music in creating transient mood-states
(Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; Martin, 1990). The happy music that was used to
enhance the positive story and self-statements included “Eine kleine Nachtmusik” and
“Divertimento” by Mozart. The sad music selections, used to enhance the negative story
and negative self-statements, were “Adagio in G minor” and “Aboe Concerto, 0P.7,
No.9” by Albinoni and “The Field of the Dead” from Alexander Nevsky by Prokofiev.
Apparatus
Participants listened to music selections played on an RCA compact disc
system, model #344A2556-0002, set at the medium volume level. Instructions for the
MIPs, which accompanied the music, were played on a Samsung tape recorder, model # 1
TCD200492, set at the medium volume.
Potential Variance of Mood Induction Procedures
A possible argument can be made that the self-referent versus other-referent
MIPs are quite different, and that the interpretation of results may be ambiguous due to
this factor. However, the differences may actually represent a more stringent test of
hypotheses conceming the self-reference variable for the current study. First, the otherreferent MIPs can be argued to be more active and personally involving because of the
writing tasks and visual imagery, compared to the self-referent MIPs that simply require

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

56

participants to read statements. Second, a meta-analysis (Westermann et al, 1996) has
indicated that Story MIPs are the most effective procedures for the induction of both
elated and depressed mood states. This finding represents a very strict test of the moodstate versus cognitive-priming hypothesis, for if subjective mood alone is sufficient to
change central self-evaluations, then the other-referent MIPs, shown to induce greater
changes in mood, should lead to greater self-evaluation changes.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Pretest Group Differences
Examination of pretest means indicated that, except for participant age, there were
no pretest differences between MIP experimental conditions (refer to Appendix O).
Although age differed statistically by experimental group, there was less than a year
difference between group age means. Pre- and posttest intercorrelations, listed in Table 1,
show that age did not correlate with any variables under investigation. Furthermore,
subsequent analyses indicated that age did not represent a significant covariate.
Preliminary investigations also revealed a lack of gender differences on
overgeneralization tendencies.
Initial Data Screening and Descriptive Statistics
Initial inspections revealed that missing data were uniformly distributed across the
data set. Missing values on the self-concept subscales were conservatively replaced with
overall means, rather than experimental group means, prior to analysis. Table 2 lists the
means, standard deviations and intemal reliabilities of the thirteen self-concept measures at
pretest and posttest. Participant ratings for the relative importance of these self-concept
variables are also provided. Table 3 lists descriptive statistics for self-concept subscales at
pretest and posttest, by experimental condition.
Creation of Dependent Variables: Principal Components Analysis
A principal components analysis (PCA) was performed on the thirteen subscale scores
of the Self Description Questionnaire-Ill (Marsh, 1989) to reduce the number of dependent
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Table 1
Pre- and Posttest Intercorrelations Amoim Profile and Self-concept Subscaie Scores (N ~ 179)

Variable

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

—

-06

-13

13

-04

13

10

-02

12

10

03

-03

-03

-10

07

-02

—

60

-23

-25

-62

-49

-19

-16

-21

-24

-05

-23

-11

-22

-17

-

-16

-38

-70

-70

-26

-23

-41

-14

-08

-34

-08

-24

-17

Profile scores

"n

c

1. Age

o
CD

■D
O
Q.
C
a
3o
■o
o

2. BDI-II
3. Overgeneralization
Self-concept scores
4. Academic

16

-19

-15

—

22

19

24

30

28

14

13

05

30

06

18

44

5. Physical App

-10

-27

-35

33

—

31

65

08

02

56

07

32

40

20

35

30

■CDD

6. Emotional Stability

-09

-57

-61

27

45

—

63

20

24

35

13

14

34

06

31

16

(/)
(/)

7. General Esteem

-01

-36

-50

39

73

63

—

14

09

62

14

26

42

23

40

28

8. Honesty/Trust

-01

-15

-21

39

11

25

24

—

10

17

15

-05

-02

00

12

14

9. Math Ability

11

-14

-20

32

12

23

08

14

01

01

01

24

-07

-02

-10

CD

Q.

(table continues)
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Table 1 (continued)

CD

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

10

-18

-37

33

61

45

70

21

09

—

-02

17

29

15

19

26

11. Parent Relations

-04

-16

-11

18

22

22

27

20

0!

15

-

09

-05

03

35

13

12. Physical Ability

-01

-02

-10

14

40

32

-03

05

27

22

—

19

03

34

01

13. Problem Solving

04

-25

-39

32

48

48

52

06

29

41

04

24

—

17

15

32

14. Religion/Spiritual

-09

-09

-08

08

20

08

24

07

-06

16

08

05

18

—

20

14

15. Same Sex

-03

22

28

23

41

37

46

21

-01

32

32

41

24

18

—

14

16. Verbal Ability

-04

-23

-23

46

31

44

24

-02

41

21

12

34

15

24

—

oo
■D
cq

'

o

10. Opposite Sex

13
CD

C
Q
.
IT

18

CD

cB

■o
S
Q.
C
o
o'
13
■D
S
CD
Q.

O
C
1

37

Note. Correlations for pretest scores are presented above the diagonal and correlations for posttest scores are presented below the
diagonal. Correlations, presented without decimal points, greater than . 15 are statistically significant (g < .05, two-tailed). Boldface
correlations are statistically significant atg < .01. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II.
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Table 2

Imnortance Ratings at Pre- and Posttest (N = 179)

Pretest
Subscale

Variable

Posttest

Importance

Importance

Subscale

General Esteem

M
SD
a

6.17
(1.2)
.95

*
*

5.96
(1.4)
.93

*

Honesty

M
SD
a

6.02
(0.8)
.71

8.2
(1.2)

6.06
(0.9)
.79

8.2
(1.1)

Parental Relations

M
SD
a

5.93
(1.2)
.88

7.8
(1.6)

5.84
(1.3)
.91

7.8
(1.5)

Emotional Stability

M
SD
a

5.04
(1.2)
.85

7.7
(1.3)

5.04
(1.3)
.90

7.8
(1.2)

Academic

M
SD
a

5.81
(1.0)
.69

7.6
(1.4)

5.70
(1.1)
.88

7.5
(1.5)

Verbal Ability

M
SD
a

5.81
(0.9)
.79

7.4
(1.3)

5.70
(1.0)
.81

7.5
(1.2)

Same Sex Relations

M
SD
a

5.90
(1.1)
.86

7.2
(1.6)

5.82
(1.2)
.66

12
(1.4)

Opposite Sex Relations

M
SD
a

5.68
(1.3)
.89

7.2
(1.6)

5.63
(1.3)
.93

7.4
(1.3)

(table continues)
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Table 2 (continued)

Problem Solving

M
SD
a

5.37
(0.8)
.66

7.0
(1.6)

5.24
(0.9)
.69

6.9
(1.5)

Physical Appearance

M
SD
a

5.00
(1.0)
.56

6.6
(1.8)

4.86
(1.1)
.81

6.8
(1.7)

Math Ability

M
SD
a

4.40
(1.7)
.83

5.6
(2.1)

4.33
(1.7)
.96

5.8
(2.1)

Religion/Spiritual

M
SD
a

5.00
(1.6)
.92

5.5
(2.7)

4.93
(1.7)
.94

5.5
(2.6)

Physical Ability

M
SD
a

5.60
(1.6)
.95

5.4
(2.2)

5.54
(1.6)
.96

5.6
(2.4)

Note. * Participants did not rate the importance of their General Esteem self-concept.
a = Cronbach's alpha
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Table 3

Pre- and Posttest Means and Standard Deviations as a Function of Experimental
Condition

Positive-self

N eaative-self

Positive-other

Negative-other

(11 = 44)

(n = 46)

(n = 43)

(n = 46)

Self-Concept Subscale

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

General Esteem

M
SD

6.23
1.0

6.27
1.1

6.09
1.3

5.44
1.7

6.13
1.3

6.14
1.2

6.23
1.3

6.01
1.4

Honest>'/Trust

M
SD

5.83
0.8

6.10
0.9

6.04
0.9

6.02
0.9

6.03
0.8

6.00
0.9

6.19
0.7

6.10
0.8

Parent Relations

M
SD

6.09
1.2

6.20
1.0

6.03
1.1

5.74
1.3

5.56
1.4

5.55
1.5

6.00
1.2

5.87
1.3

Emotional Stab

M
SD

5.13
1.2

5.34
1.3

5.05
1.2

4.80
1.1

4.89
1.1

4.91
1.3

5.10
1.3

5.11
1.5

Academic

M
SD

5.68
1.0

5.76
1.0

6.01
1.0

5.60
1.3

5.72
1.0

5.71
1.1

5.84
0.8

5.73
0.9

Verbal Ability

M
SD

5.72
0.9

5.67
0.9

5.81
1.0

5.53
1.1

5.88
0.9

5.81
0.9

5.82
0.9

5.81
1.0

Same Se.x

M
SD

5.89
0.8

5.86
1.1

5.87
1.1

5.62
1.3

5.89
1.3

5.97
1.2

5.96
1.1

5.83
1.1

Opposite Sex

M
SD

5.51
1.1

5.76
1.1

5.63
1.4

5.26
1.6

5.59
1.4

5.72
1.4

5.99
1.2

5.80
1.2

Problem Solve

M
SD

5.40
0.7

5.33
0.7

5.43
0.7

5.19
0.8

5.3!
0.8

5.24
0.8

5.34
0.9

5.22
1.1

Physical App

M
SD

4.96
1.0

4.99
1.0

4.94
1.0

4.49
1.0

5.10
0.9

5.04
1.0

5.01
1.2

4.92
1.2

Math Ability

M
SD

4.53
1.6

4.38
1.7

4.32
2.0

4.12
1.9

4.27
1.7

4.52
1.7

4.47
1.6

4.33
1.6

Religion/Spiritual

M
SD

4.59
1.5

4.54
1.6

5.04
1.7

4.85
1.9

5.20
1.7

5.13
1.7

5.15
1.5

5.20
1.5

(table continues)
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Table 3 (continued)

Physical Ability

M
SD

5.60
1.4

5.67
1.6

5.56
1.6

5.35
1.8

5.58
1.5

5.62
1.6

5.64
1.7

N o te . Pre = pretest. Post = posttest; Emotional Stab = Emotional Stability; Physical App ^
Physical appearance.
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variables entered into subsequent analyses. Pretest scores were employed, rather than
posttest, because they were considered to be more representative of participants' baseline
self-evaluations. Consistent with past research (Marsh, 1989), the majority of the subscales
were significantly intercorrelated (see Table 1). Thus, a promax principal component
analysis with oblique rotation was performed, which provided a five-component solution
that accounted for 67% of the total variance.
Dependent variables were created via composite scores^ (unweighted averages) of
items loading on the individual components. Self-concept subscales were combined based
on the component that they loaded highest on, with the exception of physical ability. This
exception will be discussed shortly.
A five-component solution, presented in Table 4, was the most parsimonious solution
that was consistent with previous research (see Marsh, 1989, for a review). This solution
also allowed for an appropriate investigation of the current study’s hypotheses surrounding
importance. A principal components analysis constrained to include only four components
was completed, however, it was less consistent with results from previous research using
the Self Description Questionnaire III (Marsh & Hocevar, 1985). This four-component
solution would also preclude investigation of the importance factor, for it combined selfconcept subscales that varied in importance. Furthermore, interpersonal and achievement
aspects of the self, related to sociotropy and autonomy, were more delineated in the fivecomponent solution.
General esteem, opposite sex relations, physical appearance, and emotional stability
had their highest loadings on the first component. Previous research investigating the
underlying structure of the SDQ-III (Marsh, 1989) suggests that general esteem and
' Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) have endorsed this method of reducing the number of correlated variables.
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Table 4

C o m p o n e n t S o lu tio n fN = 179)

Com ponent
Subscale

h-

1

2

3

4

5

Rotated component loadings (promax)
General Esteem

.813

.89

-.04

.08

.03

.07

Honesty/Trust

.680

.28

.13

.15

.07

.80

Parent Relations

.670

-.22

.10

.82

-.06

.21

Emotional Stability

.624

.68

-.15

.10

.34

.22

Academic

.740

-.15

.78

.12

.30

.19

Verbal Ability

.728

.04

.85

.08

-.26

.13

Same Sex

.691

.17

.13

.75

-.09

-.10

Opposite Sex

.729

.97

-.04

-.22

-.17

.19

Problem Solve

.692

.26

.44

-.18

.31

-.35

Religion/Spirititiial

.333

.12

.33

.08

-.39

-.20

Physical Appearance

.663

.73

.11

.04

-.13

-.10

Math Ability

.767

-.06

.03

-.08

.89

-.01

Physical Ability

.575

.12

-.17

.45

.10

-.52

Eigenvalue

3.68

1.45

1.34

1.21

1.02

% o f variance

28.34

11.14

10.31

9.33

7.85

N o t e , h = c o m m u n a lity
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emotional stability directly contribute to a hierarchical general self-concept. Accordingly,
the first component, which accounted for 28% of the total variance in scores, appears to be
connected to one’s general self-concept and, therefore, was labeled general competence.
This component can be argued to contain both achievement and interpersonal domains of
self.
Verbal ability, academic - general, and problem solving subscales had their highest
loadings on the second component, which was labeled academic competence and
accounted for 11% of the total variance. This component clearly involves achievement
domains of self. Although Shavelson’s original theoretical model (Shavelson, Hubner, &
Stanton, 1976) proposed a single, higher-order academic facet that grouped math and
verbal abilities together, subsequent research (Marsh & Hocevar, 1985; Marsh &
Shavelson, 1985; Marsh, 1986) indicated that these academic domains are consistently
uncorrelated. The PCA solution for the present study is consistent with previous findings;
there was an insignificant negative correlation (“r” = -.10) between verbal and math
abilities, and math ability did not load on the second component.
Same sex and parental relations had their highest loadings on the third component.
Physical ability also loaded highly on this component (.42), however it loaded more
heavily on the fifth component (-.52), which also had the highest loadings for the
honesty/trust subscale. The decision to combine physical ability with the two social
domains, rather than with the honesty/trust subscale, is supported by two arguments. First,
previous research (Marsh, 1989) consistently finds a substantial correlation between
physical ability and same sex relations, which is also consistently higher than the
correlation between physical ability and physical appearance. Second, investigation of the
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current study’s predictions related to importance would be disrupted if physical ability,
rated as the least important self-concept domain, was combined with honesty/trust, rated as
the most important self-concept domain. This third component, which accounted for 10%
of the total variance, taps into interpersonal domains of self, including those that may
develop within a sporting context, and was labeled social competence.
The fourth component had highest subscale loadings for math ability and a negative
loading for religion/spiritual. Similar to previous research (Marsh, 1989), religion/spiritual
did not share the proposed theoretical connection with honesty/trust. Table 1 indicates that
math ability and religion/spiritual were not significantly correlated. This observation,
combined with the negative loading for religion/spiritual, supported the decision to treat
these subscales as separate dependent variables. Math ability represents an achievement
domain of self, and religion/spiritual is not accurately described as either an interpersonal
or achievement domain.
Honesty/trust and physical ability loaded most heavily on the fifth component. As
previously discussed, physical ability was combined with the same sex and parental
relations subscales, leaving honesty/trust as a separate dependent variable. Previous
research (Marsh, 1989) has consistently failed to support the theoretical grouping of
religion/spiritual and honesty/trust into a moral cluster. The low to moderate correlations of
the honesty/trust with other subscales in previous research is also consistent with results
from the current study. The highest correlation for honesty/trust was with academic-general
(“r” = .30). This finding, combined with the fact that honesty/trust was rated as the most
important self-concept domain, supported the decision to treat honesty/trust as a separate

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68

dependent variable. Similar to the religion/spiritual scale, honesty/trust is difficult to
classify as either achievement or interpersonal in nature.
Table 5 lists pre- and posttest intercorrelations for the six dependent variables and
depression scores, which were entered in subsequent analyses as a covariate. Dependent
variables were normally distributed, and there were no univariate or multivariate outliers.
To investigate the hypothesized impact of importance on self-evaluation change, new
importance means were created for the three composite dependent variables. Similar to the
creation of the dependent variables, these means were derived by pooling (unweighted
averages) the importance rating means of the corresponding Self Description
Questionnaire-Ill subscales (see Table 6). Pretest importance ratings were considered to be
representative of participants’ baseline attitudes.
A precursor to investigating whether the importance of a self-evaluation domain
influences its stability is determining if the dependent variables differ from each other in
terms of their relative importance to the participants. Six dependent variables result in 15
possible unique pairings of importance means. Accordingly, a series of two-tailed, pairedsamples “t” tests were conducted with Bonferroni corrected alpha set at .003 (.05/15).
Importance mean pairs were significantly different from each other, except for academic
and general competence, as well as math ability and religion/spiritual (see Table 6).
To test the current study’s hypothesis that importance influences self-esteem
reactivity, dependent variables were divided into central and peripheral categories.
Examination of a scree plot for importance means of the dependent variables suggests that
a break in the pattern of means occurs between social competence and math ability. As
such, honesty/trust, academic competence paired with general competence, and social
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Table 5

= 179)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. General

79"

43**

36*

10

20**

18*

-48**

2. Academic

6 l"

72**

18*

18*

15*

20*

-29**

3. Social

48"

32**

86**

00

4. Math Ability

16*

26**

03

89**

07

10

16*

5. Religion/Spiritual

21"

18*

13

-06

93**

00

-11

6. Honesty/Trust

25"

32**

16*

14

07

74**

19**

-42"

-29**

-17*

-14

-09

-15*

Variable

Dependent Variable

11

09

22**

Covariate
7. BDI-Il

Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventor^' II, which was only measured at pretest.
Correlations for pretest variables are presented above the boldface diagonal, and
correlations for posttest variables are presented below the diagonal. Correlations
between individual variables, pre- to posttest, are presented in boldface,
p’ < .05; p " < .001
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Table 6

Pretest Importance Means. Standard Deviations and Classifications (N = 1791

Importance
Dependent Variable

M

SD

Importance Classification

1. Honesty/Trust

8 .18 a

1.18

Central

2. Academic

7.32i,

1.1

Central

3. General

7.15b

1.07

Central

4. Social

6.77 c

1.31

Central

5. Math Ability

5.6d

2.1

Peripheral

6. Religion/Spiritual

5.5 d

2.7

Peripheral

Note. Higher means indicate higher importance ratings. Means with different
subscripts are significantly different at p < .005
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competence, were classified as central self-evaluation domains with decreasing levels of
importance. Math ability paired with the religion/spiritual domain were classified as
peripheral self-evaluations.
Self-evaluations and Overgeneralization at Pretest
Overgeneralization and self-evaluations measured at pretest were examined for
possible associations. Although this examination does not allow for causal statements,
because the two constructs were assessed concurrently, it explores whether this
unprimed/latent cognitive process shares an association with self-esteem. A series of
sequential multiple regression analyses were conducted in which pretest dependent
variables were entered as criteria, depression scores were entered in the first step as a
covariate, and pretest overgeneralization was entered as the predictor variable in the second
step. Depression scores were entered as a covariate to determine whether self-evaluations
are associated with overgeneralization tendencies when the effects of depression are
statistically controlled. Using Holm’s modified Bonferroni correction of alpha (Howell,
1997), results indicated (see Table 7) that the four central self-evaluation variables were
associated with participants’ baseline depression scores. After the variance accounted for
by depression was removed, there remained an association between self-evaluations and
pretest overgeneralization for general competence [(3 = -.59, t(176) = -8.6, p < .001]. As
overgeneralization scores increased, general competence evaluations decreased. Although
not significant at corrected alpha levels, a similar trend was observed for Honesty [(3 = -.22,
t(176) = -2.5, p =.014], Math Ability [|3 = -.21, t(176) = -2.3, p = .023] and Academic
Competence [(3 = -.19, t(176) = -2.2, p = .032]. This association between baseline selfevaluations and overgeneralization is somewhat surprising, recalling Segal and Ingram’s
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Deoression as Covariate fN = 119).

H o n e sty
V a ria b le

CD

■D
O
Q.
C
a
o
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o

B

p

A c a d e m ic

G en e ra !

t(l7 6 )

B

57.5*’

6.18

P

t(l7 6 )

B

53.3*

5.98

p

t(176)

B

64.6*

6.13

48.8*

4.82

P

t( 176)

B

20.5*

5.27

P

t(176)

BDI-II
C ovariate

-.026

-.18

-2.5**

-.08

-.48

-7 .2 “

-.03

-.28

-3.9**

-.04

-.22

-3 .0 "

-.05

-.16

-2.1*

-.03

-.12

-1.4

Pretest
OG

-.16

-.22

-2.5*

-.49

-.59

-8 .6 “

-.12

-.19

-2.2*

-.09

-.11

-1.2

-.32

-.21

-2.3*

.001

.00

.01

Note. BDHI = Beck Depression Inventory II; OG = overgeneralization,
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B

6.25

Q.

C/)

t(176)

Constant
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■CDD
i

P
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M a th A b ility

S o c ia l

p* < .05, p*"^ ^ significant at Holm's modified Bonferroni correction
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(1994) argument that cognitive processes/structures (i.e. overgeneralization/depressive self
schemata) must first be primed before they have an effect on cognitive products.
Effects of Experimental Manipulation
Manipulation Check on Affect Change
A repeated measures multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with method
(self vs. other) and mood (positive vs. negative) representing between-subject variables,
and time (pretest vs. posttest) as the within-subjects variable, was conducted on the four
affect variables: DACL negative, DACL positive, VAS sad and VAS happy. Pretest
depression (BDI-II), which was correlated with the affect variables, was treated as a
covariate. Sex of participant was also examined, however, there were no significant main
or interaction effects and this variable was removed from the analysis. Appendix F
provides descriptive statistics for these variables, by experimental group. Depression was a
significant multivariate covariate, F(4, 164) = 8.33, p < .001 (see Table 8). A significant
Time x Mood multivariate interaction, F(4, 167) = 51.79, p < .001, indicated that the mood
induction procedures effectively changed participants’ mood.
Follow up ANCOVAs indicated significant Time x Mood interactions for all four
affect variables (see Table 8). Examination of the affect variable means (see Appendix P)
indicated that these Time x Mood interactions were due to participants in the negative MIP
conditions reporting more negative/less positive affect at posttest, as well as participants in
the positive MIPs reporting more positive/less negative affect at posttest.
Pre- to Posttest Change in Overgeneralization
Recall that the present study’s model of self-esteem reactivity proposes that the
process of overgeneralization in vulnerable individuals, once primed by negative events.
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Table 8

M o o d X R e fer e n t x T im e for A f f e c t S c o r e s , w it h D e p r e s s i o n S c o r e s as C ov aria te ( N =
1 79 )

ANCOVA
DACL

DACL

VAS

VAS

N egative

Positive

Negative

Positive

F (l, 167)

F ( l, 167)

F ( l, 167)

F (l, 167)

MANCOVA

Source

F(4, 164)

Between-subjects effects
BDI-II Covariate
Mood (M )

8.33*"

25.47*"

4.67*

17.55*"

15.26*"

26.13*"

66.45***

44.67*"

39.82*"

77.1*"

42.1

28.74*"

Referent (R)

1.53

M XR

1.71

Within-subjects effects
Time (T)

17.57"*

24.44***

33.75*"

TxM

51.79"*

116.17*"

133.14***

TxR

1.81

TxMxR

1.43

65.21*"

103.32*"

Note. F ratios are Pillai’s approximation of Fs. MANOVA = multivariate analysis of
variance; ANOVA = univariate analysis of variance; DACL = Depressive Adjective
Checklist, VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II.
p < .05,

2 < .01,

p < .001.
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activates their depressive self-schemata, which then bias the retrieval of negative
information from memory and decrease self-evaluations. If overgeneralization plays its
predicted causal role in self-evaluation change, then the overgeneralization tendencies of
participants’ should be directly influenced by certain MIPs. Table 9 shows pre- and posttest
descriptive statistics by experimental condition for overgeneralization. Focusing on the
total sample overgeneralization at present, “t” tests (see Table 9) indicate that the negativeself MIP caused an increase in overgeneralization scores [t(45) = 2.51, p = .016], and the
positive-other MIP caused a decrease in overgeneralization scores [t(42) = -2.86, p = .007].
This increase in overgeneralization tendencies after exposure to a procedure that directly
primes the self can be interpreted within a cognitive-priming framework. However, the
decrease in overgeneralization scores after the positive-other MIP, rather than the positiveself MIP, can not be explained within the cognitive-priming perspective.
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1: Planned Comparisons Examining Change in Self-evaluations
Pre- and posttest descriptive statistics by experimental MIP are reported in Table 10.
Stability coefficients (SC: correlations between self-evaluations at pre- and posttest) are
provided to facilitate interpretation of clinically meaningful change. Of note, the mean SC
was lowest after the negative-self MIP (“r” = .72), whereas the mean SC’s for the
remaining MIP groups are similar to the mean test-retest reliability (“r” = .87) of the SDQIII subscales. To test the specific predictions of Hypothesis 1, pre- to posttest change in
dependent variables were examined via paired samples “t” tests (see Table 11). These
analyses were based on previous research that employed similar experimental methodology
(Taylor et al., 1999), and alpha was set at .05.
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T o ta l S a m p le
O v e r g e n e r a liza tio n

H ig h
O v e r g e n e r a liza tio n

CD
Q.

■CDD

L ow
O v e r g e n e r a liza tio n

C/)
C/)

M
SD

M
SD

M
SD

Pre

Post

3.39
1.06

3.23
1.15

N e e a tiv e -self

t(43)
-1.38

Pre
3.52
1.14

Post
3.90
1.01

N eaative-other

Positive-other

t(45)
2 .5 l‘

Pre
3.59
1.10

Post
3.33
1.20

t(42)
-2.86"

Pre
3.35
1.21

Post
3.48
1.23

t(45)
1.24

Pre

Post

t(22)

Pre

Post

t(21)

Pre

Post

t(17)

Pre

Post

t(19)

4.21
.61

3.89
1.04

-1.86

4.5
.63

4.44
.71

-.35

4.67
.59

4.37
.73

-1.94

4.47
.92

4.54
.83

.48

Pre

Post

t(20)

Pre

Post

t(23)

Pre

Post

t(24)

Pre

Post

t(25)

2.49
.6!

2.50
.77

.07

2.61
.57

3.41
1.05

3 .5 "

2.81
.61

2.59
.87

-2.06*

2.49
.49

2.66
.78

1.21

Note. Pre = pretest; Post = posttest.
p‘ < .0 5 ;p * < .0 1
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Pre- and P o stte st D e p e n d e n t V a ria b le M ea n s. Standard D e v ia tio n s , and S ta b ility C o e ffic ie n ts b y E x p erim en tal C o n d itio n (N = 179)

CD

O
O
5

D ependent

N e g a tiv e -self (n = 46)

N egative-other tn = 46)

P o sitiv e-self (n = 44)

Positive-other (n = 43)

Pre

Post

SC

Pre

Post

SC

Pre

Post

SC

Pre

Post

SC

CQ

O
3

V a ria b le

CD

O’
Q
TCD3
O
Q.
C
a
3o
■o
o
CD
Q.

■CDo

1. H o n e sty

M
SD

6.04
0.9

6.02
0.9

.70

6.19
0.7

6.10
0.8

.74

5.83
0.8

6.10
0.9

.86

6.03
0.8

6.00
0.9

.73

2. A c a d e m ic

M
SD

5.78
0.8

5.44
0.8

.54

5.67
0.7

5.59
0.8

.83

5.60
0.7

5.59
0.7

.81

5.64
0.7

5.59
0.7

.79

3. G en eral

M
SD

5.45
1.0

4.99
1.1

.58

5.58
l.l

5.46
1.1

.95

5.46
0.8

5.59
0.9

.81

5.43
1.0

5.46
1.0

.90

4 . S o c ia l

M
SD

5.82
0.8

5.57
1.1

.73

5.87
1.0

5.75
1.0

.92

5.86
0.8

5.91
0.9

.91

5.67
1.0

5.71
1.0

.93

5. M ath

M
SD

4.32
2.0

4.12
1.9

.86

4.47
1.6

4.33
1.6

.96

4.53
1.6

4.38
1.7

.92

4.27
1.7

4.52
1.7

.89

6. R e lig io n

M
SD

5.04
1.7

4.85
1.9

.93

5.15
1.5

5.20
1.5

.93

4.59
1.5

4.54
1.6

.9!

5.20
1.7

5.13
1.7

.95

C/)

o'

3

M ea n SC

.72

.88

.87

.87

Note. Pre = pretest; Post = posttest. SC = Stability coefficient: correlations between dependent variables at pretest and posttest.
<1
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Hypothesis l.a: Central self-evaluations. Mixed support was obtained for Hypothesis
l.a., which focused on changes in central self-evaluations. Strong support was obtained for
predictions related to the self-referent MIPs, which were based on cognitive-priming
theory. Self-evaluations decreased significantly after the negative-self MIP for general
competence [t(45) = 3.23, p = .002]; academic competence, [t (45) = 3.07, p = .004]; and
social competence, [t (45) = 2.21, p = .032] (See Table 11). Honesty/trust was the only
central self-evaluation that did not change significantly under the negative-self condition.
Honesty/trust was also the only central self-evaluation domain to increase after exposure to
the positive-self MIP [t (43) = -4.03, p < .001], a result that is also consistent with
cognitive-priming.
Contrary to predictions regarding the other-referent MIPs, which were based upon social
comparison theory, central self-evaluations did not increase after the negative-other MIP,
nor did they decrease significantly after the positive-other MIP. Rather, an overall pattern
of decreasing self-evaluations was observed across general competence [t(43) = 2.41, p =
.020], and social competence [t (43) = 2.03, p = .048] after exposure to the negative-other
MIP (see Table 11). Figures 4, 5, and 6 show changes associated with the four MIP
experimental conditions for general, academic, and social competence, respectively.
Hypothesis l.b: Peripheral self-evaluations. Results did not support hypothesis Lb.,
which predicted that mood-state effects (i.e., self-evaluation increases after positive MIPs,
decreases after negative MIPs) would occur for peripheral self-evaluations. There was an
overall lack of change observed among peripheral self-evaluations. Only math ability
changed, with a significant increase after the positive-other condition [t(42) = -2.06, p =
.046] (see Table 11). This result does not appear to support mood-state theory, nor the
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Table 11
Self-evaluation Change. Pre- to Posttest, as a Function of Experimental Condition

Dependent
Variable

N eg a tiv e-self
t(4 5 )

p

N eeative-other
t(4 5 )

E

P ositive-self
t(4 3 )

E

Positive-other
t(4 2 )

E

.347

-4.03

<.001

.30

.763

2.41

.02

-1.66

.103

-.43

.667

.004

1.30

.199

.21

.833

.77

.447

2.21

.032

2.03

.048

-.83

.410

-.67

.508

Math

1.30

.202

1.93

.060

1.51

.138

-2.06

.046

Religion

1.81

.077

-.57

.574

.54

.591

.85

.399

Honesty

.18

.858

General

3.23

.002

Academ ic

3.07

Social

.95

Note. Negative t values indicate an increase in scores from pre- to posttest. Positive t
values indicate a decrease in scores from pre- to posttest.
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cognitive-priming theory.
Hypothesis l.c:Differentiai effects of positive and negative MIPs. “T” test results (see
Table 11) supported the hypothesis that self-evaluation change would be more pronounced
after exposure to negative (five significant changes), compared to positive (two significant
changes), MIP conditions.
Hypothesis 2: Overgenerali zation and Self-evaluation Change.
To test Hypothesis 2; that participants who were high in overgeneralization would show
greater decreases in their central self-evaluations after exposure to the negative-self MIP, a
median split was performed on pretest overgeneralization scores to create high and low
overgeneralization groups. Paired samples t-tests were then re-run for dichotomized groups
to examine change in self-evaluations caused by the negative-self MIP (see Table 12).
Results directly contrast Hypothesis 2; central self-evaluations of participants reporting
low, rather than high, overgeneralization at pretest decreased after the negative-self MIP on
general competence [t(23) = 2.87, p = .009] and academic competence [t(23) = 2.79, p =
.01], as well as a trend towards a significant decrease for social competence [t(23) = 1.93, p
= .067] (see Table 12). No significant decreases in central self-evaluations occurred among
the high overgeneralization group exposed to the negative-self MIP.
Post Hoc Analyses
Change in overgeneralization for high and low overgeneralization groups. To
determine whether the observed decreases in self-evaluations were directly associated with
increases in participants’ overgeneralization tendencies, mean changes in
overgeneralization scores after the negative-self MIP were examined for high and low
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Table 12
Self-evaluation Change Caused by Negative-self Mood Induction Procedure as a
Function of Pretest Overgeneralization (High vs. Low)

Hi eh pretest overeeneralization fn = 22)
Dependent
Pretest

Posttest

Variable

M

SD

M

SD

t(21)

Honesty

5.70

.91

5.81

1.01

-.89

General

4.84

.92

4.59

.98

1.58

Academ ic

5.38

.57

5.26

.67

1.5

Social

5.47

.86

5.37

.93

1.15

Math

3.97

2.08

3.99

2.02

-.116

Religion

4.94

1.77

4.71

1.95

2.36*

Low pretest overeeneralization fn = 24)
Dependent
Pretest
Variable

Posttest

M

SD

M

SD

t(23)

Honesty

6.36

.69

6.22

.79

.82

General

6.01

.59

5.36

1.15

2 .87"

Academic

6.14

.72

5.61

.89

2 .80"

Social

6.14

.69

5.76

1.25

1.93

Math

4.65

1.90

4.24

1.90

1.63

Religion

5.13

1.75

4.98

1.84

.806

Note. Positive t values indicate a decrease in scores from pre- to posttest.
Negative t values indicate an increase in scores from pre- to posttest.
*p < .05; **p< -.01
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pretest overgeneralization groups. This exploratory analysis was deemed appropriate after
hypothesis testing revealed that, contrary to predictions, self-evaluation decreases were
obtained among participants reporting low pretest overgeneralization. Alpha was set at .025
for this pair of post hoc analyses. Results mirror the significant self-evaluation decreases
observed pre- to posttest for the negative, self-referent MIP; a significant increase in
overgeneralization was obtained for the low pretest overgeneralization group [t(23) = 3.5, p
= .002], whereas overgeneralization remained largely stable for participants reporting high
pretest overgeneralization [t(21) = -.35, p = .727] (see Table 9).
Mood-state versus Cognitive-priming. Pattems of self-evaluation change caused by the
negative MIPs suggest that mood-state effects occurred for some central self-evaluations
(decreases after both negative MIPs), whereas cognitive-priming effects appeared to occur
for others (decrease only after negative-self MIP, not negative-other). Furthermore, these
pattems also appeared to be influenced by participants’ overgeneralization tendencies.
Additional post hoc analyses focused on self-evaluation changes caused by the negative
conditions, which are of more theoretical interest within the context of the diathesis-stress
model linking self-esteem and depression.
Direct testing of the mood-state versus cognitive-priming theories, as well as inclusion
of the overgeneralization variable, employed multiple sequential regression analyses.
Holding mood constant at the negative level, referent was contrast coded (-1 for the
negative-self condition and 1 for the negative-other condition), and overgeneralization,
after being centered, was treated as a continuous variable. The 2-way interaction term was
then computed (Aiken & West, 1991). A series of separate regression analyses were
conducted in which general, academic, and social competences were entered as criteria.
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The appropriate pretest criterion variable (i.e., dependent variable at pretest) and depression
scores were entered in the first step as covariates. The main effects and interaction term
were entered together in the second step."* Bonferroni corrected alpha was set at .0167,
resulting in an overall alpha level of .05 across the three dependent variables under
investigation.
This analysis was considered to be fairly robust to violations of the assumption of
homogeneity of variance due to the lack of outliers, the large sample size, and the equal
number of participants in each experimental condition. The pretest depression variable
satisfied criteria for inclusion as a covariate: all three dependent variables were negatively
correlated with depression, and scatterplot examinations indicated linear relationships
between these variables.
A significant referent main effect was obtained for general competence [(3 = .21, t(85) =
3.13, p = .002], and academic competence [(3 = .20, t(85) = 2.59, p= .011] (see Table 13).
These main effects were qualified by significant Referent X Overgeneralization
interactions for general competence [(3 = -.19, t(85) = -2.76, p = .007], and academic
competence [|3 = -.25, t(85) = -3.16, p = .002]. There were no main effects, nor interaction,
for social competence. Referent X Overgeneralization interactions were interpreted by
solving the regression equation for participants from the negative MIP conditions whose
pretest overgeneralization scores were one standard deviation above or below the
overgeneralization mean (SD = 1.18). Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the referent main effect on
general competence for high pretest overgeneralization participants was not significant

Entering the main effects and interaction terms in one step takes advantage of centering the
overgeneralization variable.
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Table 13

Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Evaluations After Negative Mood
Induction Procedures With Pretest Overeeneralization. Referent, and Pretest
Overeeneralization X Referent (n = 92).

Predictor
Variable

General
B

P

Academic
t(85)

B

1.14

1.63

P

Social

t(85)

B

2.81**

-.05

P

t(85)

Constant

.72

Pretest
Covariate

.83

.73

8.06''*

.69

.63

7.27***

.95

.83

12.8***

BDI-II
Covariate

-.02

-.08

-.83

-.01

-.09

-.80

.02

.12

1.29

00

.05

.06

.53

-.01

-.01

-.10

-.06

-.06

-.71

Referent (R)

.24

.21

3.13**

.16

.20

2.59*

.09

.09

1.38

Pretest
OGXR

-.17

-.19

-2.76**

-.16

-.25

-3.16**

-.05

-.06

-.92

-.10

Note. Pretest overgeneralization scores were centered before the product term was
calculated. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II; OG = overgeneralization.
p * < .0 5 ,p “ < .0 1 .p * "< .0 0 I
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[p = .03, t(85) = .37 , p > .05]. Rather, low pretest overgeneralization participants showed a
significant referent main effect [|3 = .39, t(85) = 3.73, p <.001].
Figure 7 depicts general competence changes for high (7A) and low (7B) pretest
overgeneralization participants, respectively. Thus, low pretest overgeneralization
participants had significantly lower general competence scores after the negative-self MIP
compared to the negative-other MIP, but high pretest overgeneralization participant scores
did not differ for these MIPs. This pattern was also obtained for the academic competence
variable. Low pretest overgeneralization again showed a significant referent main effect [(3
= .45, t(85) = 3.63, p < .001], but no referent main effect at high pretest overgeneralization
[p = -04, t(85) = -.39, p > .05]. Figure 8 depicts academic competence changes for high
(8A) and low (8B) pretest overgeneralization participants, respectively.
An alternative approach to assessing whether the pattems of self-evaluation change are
consistent with either mood-state or cognitive-priming theories, involved a repeated
measures multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) on the central self-evaluations:
honesty, general competence, academic competence, and social competence. Mood was
again held constant at the negative level, and time (pretest vs. posttest) was entered as a
within-subjects variable, referent (self vs. other) and dichotomized overgeneralization (high
vs. low) were entered as between-subjects variables. Depression was entered as a covariate,
and statistical analyses indicated that inclusion of this depression covariate did not violate
the assumption of heterogeneity of slopes. Preliminary investigations indicated that
inclusion of gender did not result in either a main effect, or any interactions, and it was not
included in the model. Results (See Appendix Q) are similar to those obtained through the
multiple regression analyses. The main difference is that the Overgeneralization X Referent
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interaction is insignificant for general competence in the MANCOVA; likely related to the
loss of power caused by dichotomizing a continuous variable. Additionally, the significant
time main effect for social competence, obtained through the MANCOVA, documents the
decrease observed across both negative conditions.
Summary of mood-state versus cognitive-priming results. Combined interpretation of
hypothesis testing and post hoc analyses sheds light on the primacy of cognition (cognitivepriming) or emotion (mood-state) as the mechanism responsible for self-esteem reactivity.
Distinct patterns of change were obtained for each central self-evaluation domain, and
these changes offer initial support for both cognitive-priming and mood-state theory.
Strong support was obtained for the influence of overgeneralization on the process of selfevalution. Honesty/trust only changed in response to the positive-self MIP. This result,
combined with the lack of change observed after the negative-other MIP, is consistent with
cognitive-priming theory. Academic competence decreased after the negative-self MIP, but
did not substantially decrease after the negative-other MIP, which is also consistent with
cognitive-priming theory. Furthermore, this pattern was only observed among participants
who originally reported low or medium levels of overgeneralization. General competence
decreased after both negative conditions, which initially supports mood-state theory.
However, this decrease was more pronounced after exposure to the negative-self MIP,
which lends support to cognitive-priming theory. Again, this pattern only occurred among
participants with low and medium unprimed overgeneralization levels. Social competence
showed decreases of similar magnitude after both negative MIPs, which offers initial
support for the mood-state hypothesis.
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Math ability and religion, the two peripheral self-evaluations of similar low
importance, remained largely stable after the MIPs, with the exception of a significant
increase in math ability after the negative-other MIP. This finding runs counter to both the
cognitive-priming and the mood-state theory. Table 14 summarizes the current findings and
the extent to which they support cognitive-priming or mood-state theories.
Post-Experiment Questionnaire
Participant responses to the post-experiment questionnaire functioned as 1) additional
manipulation checks, and 2) a method of investigating demand characteristics.
Manipulation Check
The frequency of completing the post-experiment questionnaire, which differed by MIP
group

(3, N = 179) = 8.22, p = .042, can be interpreted as behavioural evidence for the

mood-altering efficacy of the MIP conditions. Appendix R shows that participants in the
negative MIP conditions, compared to the positive MIPs, completed the post-experiment
questionnaire more frequently. Research (Begin, 1976) has shown that people induced into
negative versus positive moods, through a success or failure MIP, differed in their
willingness to help an experimenter. Individuals reporting low mood after a forced failure
on an experimental task were more likely to comply with experimenter’s request for help,
compared to participants exposed to a success MIP. Begin (1976) concluded that “failure”
participants’ generosity was motivated by an effort to repair their self-image. Similarly,
participants exposed to the negative, versus positive, MIP conditions in the present study
may have completed the post-experiment questionnaire more frequently to counteract their
negative mood.
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Summarv of Results

Result

Self-evaluation
Domain

Theoretical support

cq '

o

Chanue in central self-evaluations
"n
c

Increase after positive-self MIP, no change after positive-other MIP

Cognitive-priming

Academic

Decrease after negative-self MIP, no change after negative-other MIP

Cognitive-priming

General

Decreases after both negative MIPs
Greater decrease after negative-self, compared to negative-other, MIP

Mood-state
Cognitive-priming

Decreases after both negative MIPs

Mood-state

Honesty

o
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Social

Change in nerinheral self-evaluations

Q.
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1

Math Ability
Religion

(/)
o'
o

Increase after positive-other MIP only

Neither theory

No significant changes

None
Overgeneralization

Academic/General

Low and medium levels of Overgeneralization: Referent X Overgeneralization interaction
for negative MIPs

Cognitive-priming

V
UO
J
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An additional manipulation check examined the effectiveness of the MIPs in directing
participants’ focus internally versus externally. Responses to the question “During the first
part of the experimental manipulation today were you focusing on, a) mainly yourself, b)
mainly someone else, or c) both myself and someone else”, are listed in Appendix S.
The MIPs were largely effective in manipulating self-focus, with few participants
reporting that their focus of attention conflicted with their experimental condition (e.g.,
focusing on someone else during self-referent condition). Analyses were re-run after
removing participants who reported self-foci that conflicted with their experimental MIP.
No change was observed in the patterns of results. Appendix S indicates that the majority
of participants in the negative, other-referent MIP (28 out of 43 responses) reported a
combined focus on someone else and themselves. To help clarify the apparent mood-state
effect obtained for social competence, change in this domain caused by the negative-other
MIP was examined for this subgroup of participants. These students reported larger
decreases in social competence, t(27) = 2.78, p = .01, relative to all participants in the
negative-other MIP, as well as participants in the negative-self MIP (see Table 11).
Demand Characteristics
Investigation of potential demand characteristics examined participant’s level of
insight into the purpose and hypotheses of the experiment, which was queried by the post
experiment questionnaire. Responses were categorized by the experimenter into three
groups, 1) lack of insight [ex., “the purpose of the experiment was to determine how well
we were able to perceive others feelings”], 2) mood manipulation: the belief that the
experiment was designed solely to influence mood, without any mention of self-concept
change [ex., “the purpose of the research was to see if you could change my mood from
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beginning of the study to the end”] and 3) Insightful: hypothesizing a connection between
mood change and change in self-concept [ex., “to see if your mood affects how you feel
about yourself”].
Appendix T shows that insight levels did not differ across the experimental groups.
Demand characteristics were targeted by re-running analyses for specific insight levels.
Reanalysis of change in affect scores, using the same repeated measures multivariate
analysis of covariance, indicated that the effect size for the significant Time x Mood
interaction was greatest among participants who believed the purpose of the experiment
was to change mood, F (4,42) = 42.21, p. < .001, r\^ = .80, compared to insightful
participants, F (4, 64) = 27.3, p < .001, r\^ = .63, as well as compared to the total sample, F
(4, 167) = 51.79, p < .001, r f = .56. Sample size was too small to run a separate analysis
for lack of insight participants.
Hypothesis testing and post hoc analyses were re-run for insightful participants, as
well as for two combined groups, including 1) participants reporting lack of insight and
mood manipulation insight levels, and 2) participants reporting mood manipulation and
insightful rationales. Groups were combined to increase sample size. The pattem of results
obtained for the entire sample emerged for insightful participants, as well as the group
including insightful and mood manipulation participants (see Appendices U and V,
respectively). There was a lack of self-evaluation change for participants in the combined
lack of insight and mood manipulation group (see Appendix W). Post hoc tests employing
multiple regression analyses also revealed that both the insightful participants, and the
combined insightful and mood manipulation group, show a pattem of main effects and
interactions consistent with the total sample (see Appendices X and Y, respectively). This
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pattem did not emerge, however, for the lack of insight and mood manipulation combined
group (see Appendix Z).
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Summary and Interpretation of Results
The present study was designed to test the ability of two opposing theories, cognitivepriming and mood-state, to explain the mechanisms that are responsible for changes in selfevaluations. Results of the current study help clarify past research that has found support
for both theories. A clear theoretical victor did not emerge from the analyses, rather, selfevaluation change appears to be a complicated process that requires both theories to
interpret subtle nuances. The nuances that emerged included the normative importance of
the evaluations, the cognitive style of the individual making the self-evaluations, and
potential differences between social and achievement domains of the self.
The primary hypothesis of the current study predicted that the four mood-induction
procedures (MIPs) would cause different patterns of self-evaluation change, and change
would be moderated by the importance assigned by participants to these separate domains
of self. This overall hypothesis was supported by the current results. However, not all of
the specific predictions associated with the first hypothesis were supported. The first
specific prediction examined changes in self-evaluations deemed important (i.e., central
self-evaluations). Social comparison theory predicted that exposure to MIPs that focus on
an external individual would shift self-evaluations in the opposite direction of the induced
mood. Students would rate important areas of their self more favourably after comparing
themselves to someone who was worse off. Conversely, students would rate important
areas of their self less favourably after comparing themselves to someone who was better
off. This pattem did not emerge. Student’s self-evaluations were stable after the positive
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procedure that focused on an external person. Furthermore, self-evaluations tended to
decrease, rather than increase^ after the procedure that focused on a negative extemal
event. This finding, more consistent with mood-state theory than social comparison,
effectively set the stage for a direct test of mood-state versus cognitive-priming theories.
Mood-state versus Cognitive-priming
Although hypotheses were based upon cognitive-priming formulations, the pattem of
change for interpersonal self-evaluation domains appeared to offer support for mood-state
theory, whereas patterns of change for other domains of self offered support for cognitivepriming theory. Honesty/tmst, which was rated as the most important domain of self in the
current sample, was the only evaluation that improved after exposure to the experimental
procedure that targeted an individual’s positive sense of self. This increase, when combined
with a lack of change in honesty ratings for students exposed to the MIP designed to create
a happy mood devoid of self-reference, supports cognitive-priming theory.
Following from Bower’s associative network theory (1981), the positive, self-referent
procedure arguably primes one’s emotional node for joy, as well as the cognitive nodes
involving personal thoughts of a positive nature. This process is akin to activating
participants’ “idealized self’ (Markus and Nurius, 1986), which then selectively guides the
interpretation of questionnaire items and the retrieval of particular memories (i.e. the
cognitive process of self-evaluation). The positive procedure that focused on extemal
events also activated participants’ emotional node for joy, demonstrated via increases in
positive mood, however, because this procedure made no reference to self, the threshold for
activating the “idealized self” was not reached and honesty ratings did not change.
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Consistent with previous mood induction research (Mayer et al., 1990), the positive
MIPs were less powerful manipulators of mood, relative to the negative conditions.
Theorists (Westerman et al., 1996) have argued that people’s baseline mood is largely
positive, so there is little room for improvement. Perhaps a similar argument can be made
for thoughts related to the self; people generally feel positive about themselves. As such,
there is little room for increases in self-evaluation, which may explain why honesty is the
only self-evaluation to change in response to the positive self-statement MIP. Because no
other changes occurred for the remaining important self-evaluation domains after exposure
to the two positive MIPs, the effects of the negative MIPs became the focus for the rest of
the analyses.
Honesty/trust was the only central self-evaluation domain that did not decrease after
exposure to the negative, self-referent MIP. Honesty holds the highest importance rating
among participants. Perhaps a result of this ranking is that participants may be particularly
resistant to thoughts of personal dishonesty that would accompany a depressive self
schema. An alternative, and likely more probable, explanation for this stability involves
procedural elements related to the negative, self-referent procedure. This MIP employed
negative statements that specifically targeted participants’ general, academic and social
competencies, yet participants’ sense of honesty was never directly challenged. Within
Bower’s model, although the negative, self-referent MIP activated participants’ sad
emotional node, there was less activation of personal thoughts related to dishonesty.
Change in participants’ sense of academic competence, rated second in importance,
supported cognitive-priming theory because declines occurred only after exposure to the
negative procedure that directly targeted their sense of self. Participants’ change in general
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competence, similar in importance to academic competence, appears to offer support for
both theories. General competence decreased after both MIPs, which can be interpreted as
supporting mood-state theory, however, the decrease is comparatively greater after
exposure to the negative, self-referent MIP; a result consistent with cognitive-priming
theory. Equivalent decreases in social competence were obtained after both negative MIPs,
suggestive of mood-state effects.
Bower’s (1981) model is capable of interpreting these patterns of change, and helps to
determine whether the results support the primacy of cognition or emotion in selfevaluation change. Beck’s (1967, 1976) depressive self-schema can be equated to a specific
series of cognitive nodes within an individual’s associative semantic memory. Important
self-evaluations are argued to represent well-elaborated cognitive nodes within this system.
For self-evaluations to drop, cognitive nodes representative of depressive self-schemata
must be activated, in addition to negatively toned emotional nodes. Negative mood, devoid
of self-reference, represents insufficient activation for access to negative, “dreaded” views
of the self.
This postulation explains the cognitive-priming effect obtained for academic
competence. How does this argument account for the observed decreases in general and
social competence caused by the procedure designed to avoid self-reference? Incorporation
of the sociotropy/autonomy conception of depressive schemata helps to clarify the results
of the present study. The negative imaginal procedure required participants to visualize that
a friend had died in a car crash, and imagine attending their funeral with friends and family
members. Accordingly, these themes of interpersonal loss may have primed cognitive
nodes related to social relationships (interpersonal depressive self-schemata). Supporting
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this argument is the finding that social competence decreases were largest among
participants who reported a joint focus on themselves and their friend during the negative,
other-referent procedure. General competence, which includes opposite sex and physical
appearance subscales that are social in nature, can be argued to have decreased due to the
activation of this interpersonal depressive schemata. The negative, self-referent procedure
caused greater decreases in participants’ feelings of general competence presumably
because it activated both their achievement and interpersonal depressive schemata.
Conversely, the other-referent procedure appeared to have little impact on achievement
schemata, demonstrated by the lack of change in academic competence.
Adherents to mood-state theory would argue that priming of negative emotional nodes,
caused by the negative, other-referent procedure, was sufficient to cause decreases in
general and social competencies. More specifically, negative cognitive nodes within
associative memory became indirectly primed through their connection to negatively
valenced emotional nodes. This argument, however, does not account for the stability of
the academic domain after the negative, other-referent procedure, nor does it account for
the larger decreases in general competence after the negative, self-referent procedure,
despite similar decreases in mood. Collectively, interpretation of patterns of self-evaluation
change largely support cognitive-priming theory when considering interpersonal and
achievement depressive self-schemata, as well as participants’ self-reported foci. However,
altemate explanations derived from mood-state theory are also plausible for some, but not
all the domains of self.
The second specific prediction associated with the primary hypothesis examined
change in self-evaluations considered to be unimportant (i.e., peripheral self-evaluations).
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There was an overall lack of change for these evaluations, except for an increase in math
competence after the positive procedure that focused on an extemal other. This result is not
consistent with either mood-state or cognitive-priming theory. Self-evaluations considered
to be less important are likely less elaborated/prominent within an individual’s sense of
self. Accordingly, activation of depressive self-schemata does not include cognitive nodes
related to these domains.
Overgeneralization Effects
Prior to any experimental manipulation, participants’ reporting higher
overgeneralization tendencies also rated themselves as lower on self-evaluations in a
number of domains. This association, which remained even after removing the influence of
depression, was most pronounced for general competence, with a weaker connection
emerging for honesty, academic competence, and math ability. Of note, there was no
association between overgeneralization and social competence. This finding suggests that
participants who engage in the cognitive process of overgeneralization may also hold an
enduring and stable depressive self-schemata for achievement aspects of self that guided
their pretest self-evaluations. The lack of association between social competence and
overgeneralization offers further support for the multi-dimensional nature of the self.
Baseline (unprimed) overgeneralization scores predicted decreases in achievement selfevaluations caused by the negative MIPs. This predictive relationship, however,
contradicted Hypothesis 2. Participants with high baseline overgeneralization tendencies
did not report more derogatory self-evaluations after the negative, self-referent procedure.
Rather, low and medium baseline overgeneralization tendencies predicted more derogatory
general and academic competence after exposure to the self-referent, negative MIP.
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This finding can be argued to suggest that participants who overgeneralize without any
direct provocation have regular access to active, rather than latent, achievement depressive
self-schema that guided their self-evaluations at pretest. Thus, there is no drop in selfevaluations after either of the negative MIPs because their overgeneralization tendency is
negatively biasing their self-construal on both occasions. Conversely, participants who
report low and average levels of unprimed overgeneralization do not ordinarily have access
to their latent depressive schemata, which explains their comparatively higher selfevaluations at pretest. The negative, self-referent procedure required participants to actively
ruminate on their personal failures and short-comings in a number of different domains of
self. In essence, this MIP mimics the cognitive process of overgeneralization, and results in
the activation of depressive self-schemata.
The close association between overgeneralization and self-esteem reactivity is
highlighted through the varied influences of the negative MIPs. The negative, self-referent
procedure caused an increase in overgeneralization tendencies among participants reporting
low and medium levels of baseline overgeneral ization. This increase mirrored the decreases
in general and academic competencies among the same participants. Participants with high
baseline overgeneralization showed a lack of change in both their self-evaluations and their
tendency to overgeneralize. Due to the experimental design employed, which measured
primed overgeneralization levels and self-evaluations concurrently, statements that would
attribute the cause of the self-evaluation changes to overgeneralization processes must be
avoided.
In contrast to the association between overgeneralization and changes in autonomous
domains, overgeneralization appeared to be unrelated to changes in sociotropic domains.
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There were no increases in overgeneralization tendencies after the negative, other-referent
procedures, yet this experimental manipulation caused self-evaluation decreases for
sociotropic domains. Again, this finding suggests a lack of association between
overgeneralization and access/priming of interpersonal depressive schemata.
There was an apparent asymmetry in the effects of the MIPs on overgeneralization.
There was no decrease in overgeneralization after the positive, self-referent MIP, despite
the procedure being designed to increase participants’ self-esteem. Equally surprising was
the observed decrease in overgeneralization caused by the positive, other-referent
procedure. A tentative explanation for this finding draws upon research that links self
focused attention with depressive states (see Ingram, 1990, for a review). Lewinsohn and
colleagues (1985) provide a theoretical explanation for this effect. They argue that the
activation of a depressive self-schemata results in increased self-awareness, which then
hinders one’s abilities in behavioural and social areas, thereby maintaining depression.
Based on this argument, results from the current study suggest that a positive mood that
avoids priming the self may distract participants from ruminating on their failures or
personal inadequacies. Positive mood that involves direct priming of the self, however,
appears to maintain an individuals normal level of overgeneralization. Despite decreased
overgeneralization after the negative, other-referent MIP, there were no matching increases
in self-evaluations. One possible explanation is that participants were able to initially
distract themselves from their usual cognitive ruminations while filling out the
overgeneralization measure, however, filling out the self-concept questionnaire refocused
their attention on themselves, resulting in the return of their normal overgeneralization
tendencies, and a lack of change in their self-evaluations.
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Clinical versus Statistical Significance of Self-evaluation Changes
Interpretation of self-evaluation changes must be tempered with an understanding of the
clinical significance of these changes. Cohen (1965) was one of the earliest theorists to
discuss the notion that statistically significant findings may not be meaningful clinically.
Previous research (Marsh, Richards, & Bames,1986) investigating the reactivity of
responses on the Self Description Questionnaire-Ill (SDQ-III) to interventions designed to
improve self-esteem provide a context for evaluating meaningful change. Stability
coefficients (correlations between SDQ-III subscales assessed at two time periods) for
students completing an outward bound course were quite similar to the pre- to posttest
correlations between self-evaluations in the current study. Furthermore, change in
important self-evaluations caused by the negative, self-referent procedure were much larger
than changes found for students in the outward bound program. The greatest self-concept
increase for Outward Bound participants occurred in their honesty ratings, which mirrors
the current study’s increase in honesty ratings after the positive, self-referent condition.
Perhaps attitudes are more amenable to positive change, relative to competencies in
achievement or interpersonal domains.
Demand Characteristics
Demand characteristics were initially discussed as a potential confound for the present
study, and they represent a common concem for research employing both the MIP
methodology and self-reports measures (Polivy & Doyle, 1980; Westermann et al., 1996).
The use of a face valid self-concept measure, combined with experimental instructions that
asked participants to actively try and change their mood, may have informed participants’
about the purpose of the experiment, and influenced their responding at posttest. The
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finding that significant self-evaluation change only occurred among participants who
reported medium or high levels of insight into the study’s hypotheses might be interpreted
as evidence that participant responses were motivated by demand effects, rather than
caused by the experimental manipulations. An alternative argument is that the experimental
procedures successfully manipulated the mood and self-evaluations of some participants,
and it was this experience that resulted in their greater insight. Related to this argument is
the observation that participants who reported the greatest mood change also hypothesized
that manipulating mood was the sole purpose of the experiment.
Resolving these opposing arguments, in favour of “actual” experimental effects rather
than solely demand characteristics, is the complexity of the results. Why would participants
exposed to the negative MIPs be more inclined to assist the researcher than participants
exposed to the positive MIPs? Similarly, why would demand characteristics result in selfevaluation changes for important domains, but have no effect on unimportant domains? Are
participants savvy enough to predict that unimportant domains of self should stay relatively
stable? Why would participants with low and medium levels of overgeneralization be
influenced by demand characteristics, but not those with high levels of overgeneralization?
The majority of experimental research with human participants is influenced by demand
characteristics (Ome, 1962), however, the complex patterns of results observed in the
current study suggest that the MIPs influence participant’s actual thoughts and feelings.
Furthermore, echoing the writings of Polivy and Doyle (1980), the implicit demand
characteristics associated with mood induction procedures can be viewed as facilitating
genuine mood shifts.
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Integration with Past Literature
Resolving Controversies
Integration of the present findings with past research requires an understanding of the
complex interactions of the variables under study. Clarifying past debates in the literature is
achieved by examining finer grained distinctions of the variables influencing changes in
self. Since the cognitive vulnerability of overgeneralization appears to influence how the
cognitive-priming versus mood-congruency debate unfolds, integration of the current
study’s results with past research will focus on this construct.
The current study adhered to the advice of Segal and Ingram (1994) that “the key to
assessment of cognitive vulnerability is to study the activation of negative self-referent
cognitive structures” by employing priming methodologies that differ in their focus on self
reference. The current research helps to resolve previous debate surrounding cognitivepriming versus mood-state theories, as well as the predictive validity of cognitive
vulnerabilities such as overgeneralization. The finding that unprimed overgeneralization
scores share a large association with most self-concept subscales, among a population of
individuals with sub-clinical depression, contradicts Carver and colleagues’ (1998)
contention that overgeneralization is merely a concomitant effect of depression.
The association between baseline honesty and achievement self-evaluations, with
overgeneralization tendencies, among participants screened for clinical depression, is
surprising for two reasons. First, it contradicts recent arguments (Segal & Ingram, 1994)
that suggest cognitive vulnerabilities, such as overgeneralization, must first be activated
(primed) before they affect cognitive products (self-evaluations) and memory. Second, it
contradicts research (Dobson & Shaw, 1986; Kuiper, Olinger, & MacDonald, 1988;
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Swallow & Kuiper, 1987) that failed to obtain evidence of depressive schemata in remitted
depressives. This result also suggests that self-esteem reactivity may be present in non
depressed individuals, representing a possible onset vulnerability factor for future
depressive episodes.
Furthermore, cognitive-priming effects observed among participants with low and
medium unprimed overgeneralization offers some support for the predictive validity of
overgeneralization (Hammen, Marks, Mayol, & deMayo, 1985; Metalsky, Halberstadt, &
Abramson, 1987), and contradicts research that suggests a strictly non-causal, concomitant
function (Dobson, 1986; Kuiper, Olinger, & McDonald, 1988; Swallow & Kuiper, 1987).
Low level feelings of competence among participants who report high levels of
unprimed overgeneralization, combined with a lack of self-evaluation/overgeneralization
change after the negative, self-referent procedure, supports Beck’s (1967,1976) notion of a
stable, trait-like, depressive schema, at least for achievement domains of self. These
participants appear to have immediate access to what Markus and Nurius (1986) describe
as a “dreaded self’. Previous research has had difficulty showing stable cognitive
vulnerabilities in remitted depressives (Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Carver, La Voie, Kuhl, &
Ganellen, 1988; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983, 1986; Dobson, 1986). Results of the present study
draw a direct link between a hypothesized cognitive vulnerability (overgeneralization) and
low self-esteem across achievement domains of self. Given that participants were screened
for depression, this finding is particularly important.
Recall the argument of Safran, Segal, Hill, and Whiffen (1990), that the “question as to
whether schematic processing differences merely reflect the effects of mood, rather than
the operation of a cognitive structure, has yet to be conclusively resolved.” (p. 145).
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Results support the primacy of self-referent cognition as the mechanism primarily
responsible for activating depressive schemata, at least within the sample investigated in
the present study. Negatively toned cognition, therefore, does not appear to be simple by
products of emotional disturbance for these individuals. Rather, negative thoughts related
to the self appear to be necessary antecedents to self-esteem fluctuations among
participants who do not normally overgeneralize the personal implications of unfavourable
outcomes. However, the argument that negative cognition must occur before selfevaluations drop does not discount the role of affect. Recalling Bowers’ (1981) and Markus
and Nurius’ (1986) location of the self-concept within a system of affective-cognitive
structures, without the negative emotional nodes being primed concurrently with the
cognitive nodes, self-evaluations may not have decreased.
The Impact of Importance
Change in central versus peripheral self-evaluation domains supports the theoretical
inclusion of importance as a factor that influences self-concept (Byrne, 1996; Harter, 1996;
James, 1890). The finding that peripheral self-evaluations were relatively stable can be
interpreted as evidence that feelings of incompetence in unimportant domains have little
impact on self-esteem. The observation that self-concept domains of varying importance
react differently to personal experiences provides further evidence that the construct of self
is composed of multiple dimensions.
Results from the current study share some overlap with those obtained by Sedikides
(1995), who investigated peripheral and central aspects of self. Sedikides used mood
induction procedures very similar to the other-referent experimental manipulations in the
current study. Sedikides found that central self-conceptions (behaviour and trait self-
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descriptive adjectives) were unaffected by the MIPs, whereas central self-evaluations of an
interpersonal nature decreased in the present study. Similar to Sedikides’ research,
academic competence was unaffected by an imaginal MIP devoid of reference for
achievement domains of the self, and Sedikides’ descriptive adjective stimuli may not have
assessed the activation of participants interpersonal depressive schemata. Sedikides’
finding of mood-state effects for peripheral self-conceptions matches the observed increase
in math ability after the positive, other-referent MIP. Perhaps the activation of positive
emotional nodes within an individuals’ semantic memory, combined with a lack o f focus on
the self, allows for mood cues to guide peripheral self-evaluations.
Sociotropy and Autonomy Dimensions
Theorizing of sociotropic and autonomous dimensions underlying depressive self
schemata (Beck, 1983, 1987; Rector, Segal, & Gemar, 1998), and research on the schemacongruency hypothesis ( see Dozois & Backs-Dermott, 2000 for a review), was supported
by the interaction between the MIPs and patterns of self-evaluation change. Support for the
theoretical distinction between achievement and interpersonal domains of self also signifies
that previous calls (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Segal, 1988) to investigate how specific types
of life stress can trigger depression are warranted, and it contravenes Coyne and Whiffen’s
(1995) questioning of whether sociotropy and autonomy represent distinct characteristics.
The vast majority of previous research investigating schema-congruency effects for
sociotropy/autonomy dimensions obtains support for the predictive power of the sociotropy
construct, but less consistent support for the autonomy construct (Dozois & BacksDermott, 2001). This asymmetry was not found in the present study. The priming of
participants’ interpersonal schemata through the negative, imaginal condition did not result
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in decreased achievement self-evaluations, whereas priming of participants’ achievement
schemata through the negative, self-referent condition did affect these evaluations.
Furthermore, an association between the cognitive process of overgeneralization and
achievement domains of self emerged, yet this association was absent from interpersonal
domains of self. Collectively, these results strongly argue for the continued exploration of
the autonomy construct within schema-congruency research.
Contributions to the Literature
Mood induction procedures are analogous to the life events incorporated in the
Diathesis-Stress model, and therefore, they represent priming procedures that meet Safran
et al.’s (1990) criteria for ecological validity. The use of MIPs varying in self-reference
further refined the Diathesis-Stress model by examining which types of life events impact
upon self-esteem reactivity. This methodology answers the call of Hammen (1985) to
“modify formulations (cognitive) to include much more specific predictors of
person/environment conditions that lead to depression” (p.45). The lack of significant
interaction between mood and self-reference ( i.e., an equal change in positive and negative
mood, irrespective of self-reference) is a necessary condition for proper investigation of the
mood-state versus cognitive-priming debate. If the self-referent MIPs result in more
powerful shifts in mood, compared to other-referent MIPs, one would be unable to
determine if resulting self-evaluation changes were related to self-reference, or greater
mood changes. The methodology of the current study, with its differential priming of
achievement and interpersonal domains, is likely to be particularly useful for future
research examining multiple aspects of the self within the context of mood-state and
cognitive-priming theories.
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The current study’s use of a comprehensive, empirically validated, measure of selfconcept allowed for a more realistic investigation of the self-evaluation process, rather than
relying on participant response times to personal adjectives or recall of positive/negative
word lists. Furthermore, the inclusion of importance ratings for self-concept domains
helped refine and extend previous research that becomes muddied when this factor is not
examined. The experimental design allowed for practical study of the self, within a
controlled setting.
The current study highlights both the association between the cognitive process of
overgeneralization and depression levels, as well as the substantial connection between
overgeneralization and self-esteem reactivity. Researchers investigating the effects of
overgeneralization would benefit from incorporating the current study’s methodology to
reduce individual variance in this variable; recall that all participants reported fairly similar
levels of overgeneralization after the negative, self-referent MIP.
Theoretical and Clinical Implications
The present study supports Segal’s (1988) theorizing that cognitive processes
(overgeneralization) and structures (depressive self-schemata) may predispose individuals
to depression. Although Segal argued that these cognitive structures remain latent until
activated, the present study suggests that some individuals may have access to these
derogatory thought processes on a regular basis, which leads to low feelings of competence
and self-worth. Furthermore, results also suggest that an individuals’ depressive
achievement self-schema may hold stronger associations with cognitive vulnerabilities.
Both cognitive theorists and researchers would benefit from continued incorporation of
latency/priming conceptualization in their work.
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In light of recent evidence pointing to self-esteem reactivity as a stronger predictor of
depression (Roberts & Gotlib, 1997; Roberts & Monroe, 1994), than level of self-esteem,
the current study’s refinement of specific factors that influence the process of selfevaluation change certainly holds clinical importance. Cognitive therapists have
incorporated the correction/elimination of cognitive vulnerabilities into their applied
activities. Working backwards from research suggesting that self-esteem reactivity predicts
depression, therapeutic goals aimed at minimizing overgeneralization tendencies could help
to buffer individuals’ from developing depression. Helping clients to compartmentalize the
impact of negative events may prove to be an important therapeutic aim. Furthermore, the
observed influence of self-reference on self-esteem reactivity suggests that therapeutic
discussion that examines interpretation of negative life events is likely a useful therapeutic
endeavor. The current study also offers support for recent therapy programs specifically
designed to enhance self-esteem as a means to counteract depression (Bums, 1993).
Limitations
Generalization of results outside the laboratory is always an issue with experimental
research, and extemal validity concems temper the results of the current study. Although
the mood induction procedures are “analogous” to life events, the repercussions for
participants’ sense of self are only imagined. Future research could examine selfevaluation changes after real life negative and positive events that differentially impact
interpersonal and achievement domains of self. The loss in experimental control would
be balanced by an increase in ecological validity of such an approach.
The exclusion of participants reporting elevated depressive symptoms also limits
generalizability of results. Although this constraint likely decreased potential
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confounding variance related to depression, the self-evaluations of depressed individuals
could follow different patterns of change. Conducting the same experiment with a
depressed sample, for instance, may provide support for the mood-state theory; perhaps
subjective mood alone is sufficient to further bias the self-evaluations of depressed
individuals.
Another generalizability concern related to our participant sample is the use of
university undergraduate students. Wintre, North, and Sugar (2001) have discussed the
potentially negative implications of an over-reliance on undergraduate participants.
Despite the theoretical rationale provided for studying self-esteem fluctuations within this
age group, argued to be in a process of solidifying their sense of self, the present study’s
specific findings may be directly related to the unique characteristics of this sample. For
example, a non-university sample likely would not attach the same importance to the
academic self-evaluations that comprised the main achievement domain in the current
study. Although the relative importance of the self-evaluation domains would likely be
dependent upon the population sampled, I would argue that the overall patterns of change
would remain; important self-evaluation domains would change in accordance with the
cognitive-priming theory, and unimportant self-evaluation domains would remain
relatively stable. Replicating the current study across various samples would further
delineate the complexities involved in cognitive models of self-esteem reactivity and
depression.
Related to statistical conclusion validity, the reliance on specific, hypothesized
predictions (planned comparisons) and inclusion of Holm’s modified Bonferroni (Howell,
1997) helped conserve alpha levels. However, due to the complexity of the current study, a
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large number of analyses were conducted, which increased the possibility of Type I errors.
Despite this concern, many of these analyses were based on previous research findings, and
the pattern of results suggests that the relatively small changes in self-evaluations are
interpretable within a unified theory. Supportive of this argument is the fact that observed
self-evaluation changes in the present study were greater than changes measured in late
adolescents before and after enrollment in a motivational program designed to increase
self-esteem.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Attitude Towards Self Scale - OverReneralization Subscale
Please rate your agreement with the following statements using the rating scale provided
below.
1
1 very
strongly
agree

2
1 strongly
agree

3
1 agree

4
5
6
1 neither
1 disagree 1 strongly
agree or disagree
disagree

7
1 very
strongly
disagree

1 . Noticing one fault of mine makes me think more and more about other faults.
2 . When even one thing goes wrong 1 begin to feel bad and wonder if 1 can do well
at anything at all.
3. How 1 feel about myself overall is easily influenced by a single mistake.
4. The things about myself that other people like and respect are unimportant to me
when 1 feel down.
1 often change from feeling extremely good about myself to seeing only the bad
in me and feeling like a failure.
6 . If something goes wrong - no matter what it is -1 see myself negatively.
7. My feelings about myself drop if 1 notice any weaknesses or shortcomings.
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Appendix B
Visual Analogue Scale
Please rate your current mood state using the adjectives listed below by making a
vertical slash across the line.
Angry
0 --------not at all

100

extremely

Happy
0 --------not at all

100

extremely

Anxious
0 --------not at all

■—

100

extremely

Relaxed
0 --------not at all

100

extremely

Sad
0 ----------not at all

100

extremely

Shameful
0 --------not at all

-—

100

extremely

Calm
100

not at all

extremely

Guilty
0 --------not at all

■—

100

extremely
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Appendix C
Depressive Adjective Checklist - Form A
DIRECTIONS: Below you will find words that describe different kinds of moods and
feelings. Circle the words that describe How You Feel Now. Some of the words may
sound alike, but we want you to circle all the words that describe your feelings. Work
rapidly and circle all of the words that describe how you feel now.
1. Wilted

17. Strong

2. Safe

18. Tortured

3. Miserable

19. Listless

4. Gloomy

20. Sunny

5. Dull

21. Destroyed

6. Gay

22. Wretched

7. Low-spirited

23. Broken

8. Sad

24. Light-hearted

9. Unwanted

25. Criticized

10. Fine

26. Grieved

11. Broken-hearted

27. Dreamy

12. Down-cast

28. Hopeless

13. Enthusiastic

29. Oppressed

14. Failure

30. Joyous

15. Afflicted

31. Weary

16. Active

32. Droopy
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Appendix D
Depressive Adjective Checklist - Form B
DIRECTIONS: Below you will find words that describe different kinds of moods and
feelings. Circle the words that describe How You Feel Now. Some of the words may
sound alike, but we want you to circle all the words that describe your feelings. Work
rapidly and circle all of the words that describe how you feel now.
1. Downhearted

17. Clean

2. Lively

18. Dispirited

3. Unfeeling

19. Moody

4. Alone

20. Pleased

5. Unhappy

21. Dead

6. Alive

22. Sorrowful

7. Terrible

23. Bleak

8. Poor

24. Light

9. Forlorn

25. Morbid

10. Alert

26. Heavy-hearted

11. Exhausted

27. Easy-going

12. Heartsick

28. Gray

13. Bright

29. Melancholy

14. Glum

30. Hopeful

15. Desolate

31. Mashed

16. Composed

32. Unlucky
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Appendix E
Self Description Questionnaire - III
T his is a chance for you to consider how you think and feel about yourself. T his is not a test - there
are no right or w rong answ ers, A nd everyone will have different responses. T he purp o se of this study is to
determ ine how people describe them selves and w hat characteristics are m ost im portant to ho w people feel
ab o u t them selves.
T he first task is a series o f statem ents that are m ore or less true (or m ore or less false) descriptions o f
you. Please use the follow ing eight-point response scale to indicate h o w tru e (or false) each item is as a
description of you. R espond to the item s as you N O W feel even if you felt differently at som e other tim e
in your life. In a few instances, an item m ay no longer b e appropriate to you, though it w as at an earlier
period o f your life (e.g., an item about your present relationship w ith y o u r parent(s)/guardian(s) if they a re
no longer alive). In such cases, respond to the item as you w ould have w hen it w as appropriate. T ry to
avoid leaving any item s blank. A fter com pleting all the item s, you w ill b e asked to select those that b est
describe im portant aspects - either positive or negative - o f how you feel about yourself. C onsider this as
you are com pleting the survey.

1
D efinitely
False

1.
'

1.
3.
4.

's.
'

6.

'

1.

'

8.
9.
10 ,

11.
1 2.

13.
14.
15.
16
17,
18,
19.

20 .
21 .

22 ,
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

4
5
6
7
8
M o re
M ore
M o stly
D efin itely
T rue
F alse
T rue
T ru e
T ru e
T han
Than
T ru e
False
I find m any m athem atical problem s interesting and challenging.
M y parents are not very spiritual/religious people.
O verall, I have a lot o f respect for m yself.
I often tell sm all lies to avoid em barrassing situations.
I get a lot o f attention from m em bers of the opposite sex.
I have trouble expressing m yself w hen trying to w rite som ething.
I am usually pretty calm and relaxed.
I hardly ever saw things the sam e w ay as m y parents w h en I w as grow ing up.
I enjoy doing w ork for m ost academ ic subjects.
I am never able to think up answers to problem s that h a v e n ’t been already figured out.
I have a physically attractive body.
I have few friends of the sam e sex that I can really co u n t on.
I am a good athlete.
I have hesitated to take courses that involve m athem atics.
I am a spiritual/religious person.
O verall, I lack self-confidence.
People can alw ays rely on me.
I find it difficult to m eet m em bers of the opposite sex w h o m I like.
I can w rite effectively.
I w orry a lot.
I w ould like to bring up children o f m y ow n (if I have any) like m y parents raised me.
I h ate studying fo r m any academ ic subjects.
I am good at com bining ideas in w ays th at others have n o t tried.
I am ugly.
I am com fortable talking to m em bers of the sam e sex.
I am aw kw ard and poorly coordinated at m any sports an d physical activities.
I have generally done b etter in m athem atics courses th an other courses.
Spiritual/religious beliefs have little to do w ith m y life philosophy.
O verall, I am pretty accepting of m yself.
B eing honest is not particularly im portant to me.
I have lots o f friends o f the opposite sex.
2
F alse

3
M ostly
False
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1

Definitely
False

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
_71.
72.
_73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

2

3

False

Mostly
False

4

More
False
Than
True

5

6

More
True
Than
False

Mostly
True

7
True

8

Definitely
True

I have a poor vocabulary.
I am happy m ost of the tim e.
I still have m any unresolved conflicts w ith m y parents.
I like m ost academ ic subjects.
I w ish I had m ore im agination and originality.
I h ave a good body build.
I d o n ’t get along very w ell w ith other m em bers of the sam e sex.
I have good endurance and stam ina in sports and physical activities.
M athem atics m akes m e feel inadequate.
Spiritual/religious beliefs m ake m y life b etter and m ake m e a hap p ier person.
O verall, I d o n ’t have m uch respect for m yself.
I nearly alw ays tell the truth.
M ost o f m y friends are m ore com fortable w ith m em bers o f the opposite sex th an I am.
I am an avid reader.
I am anxious m uch of the tim e.
M y parents have usually been unhappy or disappointed w ith w hat I do and h av e done.
I have trouble w ith m ost academ ic subjects.
I enjoy w orking out new w ays of solving problem s.
T here are lots o f things about the w ay I look that I w ould like to change.
I m ake friends easily w ith m em bers o f the sam e sex.
I hate sports and physical activities.
I am quite good at m athem atics.
M y spiritual/religious beliefs provide the guidelines by w hich I conduct m y life.
O verall, I have a lot of self-confidence.
I som etim es take things th at do not b elong to me.
I am com fortable talking to m em bers o f th e opposite sex.
I do not do w ell on tests that require a lot o f verbal reasoning ability.
I hardly ever feel depressed.
M y values are sim ilar to those of m y parents.
I am good at m ost academ ic subjects.
I am not m uch good at problem solving.
M y body w eight is about right (neither too fat n o r too skinny).
O ther m em bers o f the sam e sex find m e boring.
I have a high energy level in sports and physical activities.
I have trouble understanding anything th at is based u p o n m athem atics.
C ontinues spiritual/religious grow th is im portant to me.
O verall, I have a very good self-concept.
I never cheat.
I am quite shy w ith m em bers o f the o p posite sex.
R elative to m ost people, m y verbal skills are quite good.
I tend to be highly - strung, tense, and restless.
M y parents have never had m uch respect fo r me.
I am not particularly interested in m ost academ ic subjects.
I have a lot o f intellectual curiosity.
I dislike the way I look.
I share lots o f activities w ith m em bers o f th e sam e sex.
I am not very good at any activities that require physical ability and coordination

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

122
Appendix E
7
6
5
8
M ore
Mostly
True
Definitely
True
T rue
True
T han
F alse
79. I have alw ays done w ell in m athem atics classes.
80. I rarely if ever spend tim e in spiritual m editation or religious prayer.
81. O verall, nothing that I do is v ery im portant.
82. Being dishonest is often the lesser o f tw o evils.
83. I m ake friends easily w ith m em bers of the opposite sex.
84. I often have to read things several tim es b efo re I understand them .
85. I do not spend a lot of tim e w orrying about things.
86. M y parents treated m e fairly w hen I w as young.
87. I leam quickly in m ost academ ic subjects.
88. I am not very original in m y ideas, thoughts and actions.
89. I have nice facial features.
90. N ot m any people o f the sam e sex like me.
91. I like to exercise vigorously at sports and/or physical activities.
92. I never do w ell on tests that req u ire m athem atical reasoning.
93. I am a b etter person as a consequence of m y spiritual/religious beliefs.
94. O verall, I have pretty positive feelings ab o u t m y self.
95. I am a very honest person.
96. I have had lots o f feelings o f inadequacy ab o u t relating to m em bers o f the opposite sex.
97. I am good at expressing m yself.
98. I am often depressed.
99. It has often been difficult for m e to talk to m y parents.
0 0 .1 hate m ost academ ic subjects.
0 1 .1 am an im aginative person.
0 2 .1 w ish that I w ere physically m ore attractive.
0 3 .1 am popular w ith other m em bers of the sam e sex.
0 4 .1 am poor at m ost sports an d physical activities.
05. A t school, m y friends alw ays cam e to m e fo r help in m athem atics.
0 6 .1 am basically an atheist, and believe that there is no being higher than man.
07. O verall, I have a very poor self-concept.
0 8 .1 w ould feel ok about cheating on a test as long as I did not get caught.
0 9 .1 am com fortable being affectionate w ith m em bers o f the opposite sex.
10. In school I had m ore trouble learning to read than m ost other students.
1 1 .1 am inclined tow ards b eing an optim ist.
12. M y parents understand me.
1 3 .1 get good m arks in m ost academ ic subjects.
1 4 .1 w ould have no interest in b ein g an inventor.
15. M ost o f m y friends are b etter looking th an I am.
16. M ost people have m ore friends o f the sam e sex than I do.
1 7 .1 enjoy sports and physical activities.
1 8 .1 have never been very excited about m athem atics.
1 9 .1 believe that there w ill b e som e form o f continuation o f m y sp irit o r soul after m y death.
20. O verall, I have pretty negative feelings about myself.
2 1 .1 value integrity above all o th er virtues.
2 2 .1 never seem to have m uch in com m on w ith m em bers of the o pposite sex.
2 3 .1 have good reading com prehension.
2 4 .1 tend to be a very nervous person.
2 5 .1 like m y parents.

1
D efinitely
F alse

2

False

3
M ostly
False

4

More
False
Than
True
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1
Definitely
False

2
F a lse

3
M ostly
False

4
M o re
F a lse
T han
T ru e

5
M ore
T rue
T han
False

6
M o stly
T ru e

7
True

8
D efin itely
T ru e

1 2 6 .1 could never achieve academ ic honours, even if I w orked harder.
1 2 7 .1 can often see better w ays o f doing routine tasks.
1 2 8 .1 am good looking.
1 2 9 .1 have lots o f friends of the sam e sex.
1 3 0 .1 am a sedentary type w ho avoids strenuous activity.
131. O verall, I do lots of things th at are im portant.
1 3 2 .1 am not a very reliable person.
133. S piritual/religious beliefs have little to do w ith the type of person I w ant to be.
1 3 4 .1 have never stolen anything o f consequence.
135. O verall, 1 am not very accepting o f m yself.
136. Few , if any o f m y friends are very spiritual or religious.
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Appendix F
Self-Description Questionnaire-Ill: Importance ratings
D ifferent characteristics, both positive and negative, vary in their im portance in determ ining how you feel
about yourself. F or exam ple, the statem ent “I am m usically talented” m ay b e very inaccurate as a
description of you, b u t it m ay also be very unim portant ab o u t how you feel about yourself. B elow are
statem ents about different characteristics. For each statem ent please judge;
a) H ow A C C U R A T E the statem ent is as a description of you; and
b) H ow IM PO R T A N T the characteristic is in determ ining how y o u feel (either positive or negative)
about yourself.
P lease use the follow ing response scale:

1

2

V ery
Inaccurate/
unim portant

3

4

Inaccurate
U nim portant

5
M oderate
or
Average

7

9

A ccurate/
Im portant

V ery
A ccurate/
Im portant

ACCURACY:

IMPORTANCE:

H ow accurate is this
statem ent about you?
(see above scale)

H ow im portant is the
characteristic to you?
(see above scale)
I am good at sports and physical activities
I am physically attractive/good looking
I have good interactions/relationships w ith
m em bers of the opposite sex.
I have good interactions/relationships w ith
m em bers of the sam e sex.
I have good interactions/relationships w ith
m y parents.
I am an em otionally stable person.
I am a spiritual/religious person.
I am an honest/reliable/trustw orthy person.
I have good verbal skills/reasoning ability
I have good m athem atical skills/reasoning
ability.
I am a good student in m ost academ ic subjects
I am good at problem solving/creative thinking
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Appendix G
Consent Form A
SELF-CONCEPT STUDY
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR CONSENT
W h at’s it about?
W e are studying the relationships betw een self-concept (academ ic, physical appearance, peer
relations) and depression. This research is being conducted by Dr. Cheryl T hom as (A ssociate P rofessor,
D epartm ent of Psychology, U niversity of W indsor; 253-3000, ext. 2252) and D aniel T ay lo r (G raduate
R esearch A ssistant; 253-3000, ext. 2217).
If you agree to participate, you w ill b e scheduled to attend a research session in the D epartm ent o f
Psychology w here you w ill com plete a questionnaire asking about different areas o f y o u r self-concept and
w hether y ou are experiencing any depressive sym ptom s. It w ill take about 30 m inutes o f y o u r tim e to
com plete the questionnaire.
W h at’s in it for you?
T hrough participation in this study, you w ill earn o n e b o n u s p o in t th at you m ay subm it for cred it in
any course in w hich the accum ulation of research credits is perm itted. A lso, since self-concept is an area o f
interest and concern for m any university students, responding to the questionnaire m ay b e intrinsically
interesting to you. T here are no serious risks associated w ith participation. H ow ever, you w ill b e asked
about any current depressive sym ptom s and som e o f the questions m ay cause som e m inor discom fort.
Should you experience any distress as a consequence o f your participation, you m ay call the Psychological
Services Centre (973-7012) or see a counselor at Student H ealth and M edical Services (973-7002).
Y our rights as a participant
Y our participation in this study is com pletely voluntary and you h av e the rig h t to w ithdraw at any
tim e w ithout penalty o r explanation. Y ou m ay refrain from answ ering questions you prefer to om it.
Y our responses are confidential. Y ou w ill n ot b e asked to put your nam e anyw here o n the
questionnaire and this consent form w ill be stored separately from your responses to th e questionnaire.
Y our individual responses will not be shared w ith others; only group o r sam ple averages w ill b e used in
research reports about the study.
If you have any questions about the study, you m ay ask them before, during, or subsequent to y o u r
participation in the study. A t the conclusion of the study, a sum m ary o f th e findings w ill b e posted o n D r.
T hom as’s office door (CHS 257-2). A ny concerns or questions about th is study m ay b e reported to D r.
Stew art Page, Chair, P sychology Ethics Com m ittee (253-3000).

PARTICIPANT CONSENT
I understand the inform ation provided above and I consent to participate in th e study as described.

(Please sign both copies o f this form. Return one to the researcher and retain one for your own information
and records.)
Student Signature;

____________________________

D ate:_________________________________
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Appendix H
Scripted Introduction
Hello. Thank you for coming in today. 1 am going to let you have a seat in this
comfortable chair, which reclines. To start things off I want you to read over this
consent form, and if you do not have any questions you can sign both copies, keep one
for your records and then give one to me.
WAIT FOR THEM TO READ OVER CONSENT AND ANSWER ANY
QUESTIONS. AFTER THEY HAND ME THE INFORMED CONSENT.
Thank you. You have noticed the stereo equipment and you will be listening to
music on the CD player today (point to it) and instructions on the tape recorder (point
to it). Both play buttons have been marked so that there is no confusion (point to both
markers). Unless you have any questions, I am going to leave you with these two sheets
(DACL A and MIP Instructions). Fill out the first sheet, and then read the experiment
instructions on the second sheet. When the experiment is over you can come and get me
outside in the hall. Thanks again for your help with my research.
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Appendix I
Consent Form B

Consent Form
Mood and Perception Study
My signature on this sheet indicates that I agree to participate in a study
assessing the impact of emotional experience on peoples’ perceptions. Part
of this experiment involves procedures designed to either increase or
decrease your mood for short periods of time. Signing this form also indicates
that I understand the following:
1. 1am a volunteer and can withdraw at any time from the study
without penalty
2. No harmful outcomes have been documented in association with
the procedures employed in this experiment. If, however, any of the
questions or procedures cause any discomfort I can call Student
Health and Medical Services (973-7002) or Psychological Services
Centre (973-7012).
3. The data 1provide will be confidential
4. I may receive a summary of the project, upon request, following the
completion of the study.

Name of the Participant (please print)

Student Number

Signature of the Participant

Date
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Appendix J
Post-Experiment Questionnaire
Now that the experiment is completely finished I would like to know if you attempted
to figure out the purpose of this research. Please list in the space provided below what
you thought the purpose of the experiment was. Furthermore, please state whether
your answers were related to how you honestly felt and thought, or whether you
attempted to “help me out” by providing the answers you thought I wanted.

Purpose of the Experim ent

Reasons for your Answers

During the first part of the experimental manipulation today were you focusing
on:
a)
b)
c)

mainly yourself
mainly someone else
both myself and someone else.
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Appendix K
Positive, Self-referent Mood Induction Statements
1. Being in college makes my dreams more possible.
2. The world is full of opportunity and I'm taking advantage or it.
3 .1 know if I try I can make things tum out fine.
4 . 1 bet things will go well for the rest of the day.
5. When I have the right attitude, nothing can depress me.
6. Most people like me.
7. I've got some good friends.
8. My parents brag about me to their friends.
9 . 1 know I can get the things I want in life.
10. My future is so bright I have to wear shades.
1 1 .1 feel creative.
12.1 can make things happen
13. Nothing can bum me out now.
14. Things look totally awesome.
15. The relationships I have now are the best I've ever had.
16. It doesn't get any better than this.
1 7 .1 can make any situation tum out right.
18.1 feel completely aware.
19. I'm in charge of my like and I like it that way.
20. Life's a blast, I can't remember when I felt so good.
21. I'm going to have it all!
22. When it comes right down to it. I'm just too cool.
2 3 .1 know I can do it; I'm going to seize the day!
24. I'm energized
25. It's great to be alive!
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Appendix L
Negative, Self-referent Mood Induction Statements

1 .1 feel a little down today.
2. My classes are harder than I expected.
3. Everyone else seems to be having more fun.
4. Sometimes I feel so guilty that I can't sleep.
5 .1 wish I could be myself, but nobody likes me when I am.
6. Today is one of those days when everything I do is wrong.
7 .1 doubt that I'll ever make a contribution to the world.
8 .1 feel like my life is in a rut that I'm never going to get out of.
9. My mistakes haunt me, I've made too many.
10. Life is such a heavy burden
11. I'm tired of trying.
12. Even when I give my best effort, it just doesn't seem to be good enough.
13. Nobody understands me or even tries to.
1 4 .1 don't think things are ever going to get better.
1 5 .1 feel worthless.
16. What's the point of trying?
17. My parents don't know who I am.
18. When I talk no one really listens.
1 9 .1 feel cheated by life.
20. Why should I try when I can't make a difference anyway?
21. Sometimes I feel really guilty about the way I've treated my parents.
22. Every time I tum around, something else has gone wrong.
23. I'm completely alone.
24. There is no hope.
2 5 .1 feel I am being suffocated by the weight of my past mistakes.
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Appendix M
Instructions for the Self-referent Mood Induction Procedures
INSTRUCTIONS

I will be reading a series of cards with statements typed on them. These statements
represent a mood state. In order to participate fully and successfully, I will need to be
willing to feel and experience each statement as it would apply to me personally. In other
words, when I read each statement, I will allow myself to respond as though the statement
had been my own original thought. I will go with the feeling and not try to stop it.
1. I will read each of the following statements to myself and then I will read the
statement aloud.
2. At first I might feel like resisting the mood. However, I will see that it is the case that
I have the opportunity to leam to talk myself into a mood, and obviously, I will also
leam how to talk myself out of one. When this happens, I will find that I have learned
something valuable about myself; I can leam to control my moods. Thus, I will try to
experience the mood suggested.
3. I will feel each item, making the statement my own. I will experience the mood
suggested and will not attempt to stop it. I will visualize a scene in which I have had
such a feeling or thought. Then I will begin to say whatever comes to mind that
relates to the feeling. This is a type of free association - letting thoughts that pertain
to the feeling flow freely.
4. I will also be listening to CD music played on the stereo that has been selected to
facilitate me entering a specific mood
5. I am now ready to experience the statements that follow. From this point forward
whenever the voice on the tape recorder instmcts me (every 20 seconds), I will go on
to the next page. I will spend this 20 seconds reading the statements, listening to the
music and experiencing the feelings they suggest to me. I am ready to begin.
PLEASE PRESS PLAY ON THE CD PLAYER NOW AND PRESS PLAY ON TH E
TAPE RECORDER.
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Appendix N
Instructions for the Other-referent Mood Induction Procedures
INSTRUCTIONS
1. You will be viewing a series of images that are accompanied by short stories. You
will use these images to help guide your imagination in the creation of a story that is
centered around a close, (male/female) friend.
2. You will be instructed to think about the thoughts and feelings of your friend who is
the main character in the story. You will also be instructed to write about the
thoughts and feelings of this friend. Please remember to focus on the thoughts and
feelings of your friend and not your own.
3. These stories are designed to induce a mood state. In order to participate fully and
successfully, you will need to be willing to feel and experience the mood suggested
by the stories. You will go with the feeling and not try to stop it.
4.

At first you might feel like resisting the mood. However, you will see that it is the
case that you have the opportunity to use your imagination to get yourself into a
mood, and obviously, you will also leam to use your imagination to get yourself out
of one. When this happens, you will find that you have leamed something valuable
about yourself; you can leam to control your moods. Thus, you will try to experience
the mood suggested.

5. You will become involved in each story and experience the mood suggested and not
attempt to stop it. You will visualize the scenes depicted by the images; using sights,
smells, and sounds, and concentrate on the thoughts and feelings of your male friend
that come to mind. This is a type of free association - letting thoughts that pertain to
the feeling flow freely.
6. To assist you in creating an appropriate mood you will also be listening to music
chosen to facilitate mood change.
7. You are now ready to engage in the guided imagery process. From this point forward
you will use your imagination, combined with the music, to create a story and
experience the feelings they suggest to you. You are ready to begin.
PLEASE PRESS PLAY ON THE CD PLAYER AND PRESS PLAY ON THE
TAPE RECORDER W HICH W ILL PROVIDE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
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Appendix O
Means. Standard Deviations and Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) Exam ining Pretest
Group Differences

Experim ental mood induction procedure
N eg-self

N eg-other

P os-self

Pos-other

(n = 4 6 )

(n = 46)

(11 = 44)

(n = 43)

F (l, 178)

E

20.89
1.4

20.5!
1.4

21.07
1.7

20.16
1.3

3.318

.021

9.27
6.0

8.35
6.0

8.39
5.4

9.74
5.5

.618

.604

SD
M
SD

3.52
1.1

3.35
1.2

3.39
1.1

3.59
1.1

.419

.74

6.09
1.3

6.23

6.23
1.0

6.13

.142

.935

1.3

6.04
0.9

6.19
0.7

5.83
0.8

6.03
0.8

1.551

.203

6.03
1.1

6.00
1.2

6.09
1.2

5.56
1.4

1.718

.165

5.05
1.2

5.10

5.13
1.2

4.89
1.1

.340

.796

6.01
1.0

5.84
0.8

5.68

.359

1.0

5.72
1.0

1.08

SD
Verbal A bility

M
SD

5.81
1.0

5.82
0.9

5.72
0.9

5.88
0.9

.243

.866

Sam e Sex

M
SD

5.87
1.1

5.96
I.l

5.89
0.8

5.89
1.3

.057

.982

O pposite Sex

M

5.63
1.4

5.99
1.2

5.51
1.1

5.59
1.4

1.29

.279

5.43
0.7

5.34
0.9

5.40
0.7

5.31
0.8

.233

.873

Variable

Age

M
SD

BDI-II

Overgen

M

Self-C oncept Subscale
General Esteem

M
SD

Honesty/Trust

M
SD

Parent Relations

M
SD

Emotional Stab

M
SD

Academic

M

SD
Problem Solve

M
SD

1.3

1.3

(appendix co ntinues)
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A ppendix O (continued)

Physical App

M
SD

M ath A bility

M
SD

Religion/Spiritual

M
SD

Physical A bility

M
SD

4.94
1.0

5.01
1.2

4.96
1.0

5.10
0.9

.202

.895

4.32
2.0

4.47

4.53

.884

1.6

4.27
1.7

.218

1.6

5.04
1.7

5.15
1.5

4.59
1.5

5.20
1.7

1.316

.271

5.56
1.6

5.64
1.7

5.60
1.4

5.58
1.5

.019

.996

S o te . N e g - s e lf = negative-•self; N eg -■other = n eg a tiv e --o th er; Pos--se lf = p o sitiv e --self; P o so th e r = p o s itiv e -o th e r; B D I-II = B e c k D e p re s s io n In v e n to ry II; O v e rg e n = o v e rg e n e ra liz a tio n ;
E m o tio n a l S ta b = E m o tio n a l S ta b ility ; P h y sic a l A p p = P h y sic a l a p p e a ra n c e .
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Pre- and Posttest Affect Mean Scores and Standard Deviations as a Function of Experimental Condition

o

3
O
O
CD

■D

P o s itiv e -s e lf (n= 4 4 )
P re te s t

cq'

o

N e g a tiv e -s e lf (n= 46)

P o s itiv e -o th e r (n = 43)

N e g a tiv e -o th e r (n= 46)

P re te s t

P re te s t

Affect
Variable

o

M

SD

P o s tte s t

M

SD

P re te s t

M

SD

P o s tte s t

M

SD

M

SD

P o s tte s t

M

SD

M

SD

P o stte st

M

SD

CD

o

DACL neg

2.00a

2.5

0.95b

1.8

1.78a

2.6

5.54b

4.8

2.26a

2.5

1.07b

1.7

1.67a

2.5

7.74b

4.0

DACL pos

5.11a

2.7

6.16b

2.6

4.63a

2.9

1.13b

2.1

4.12a

2.8

4.91a

2.6

4.89a

2.9

0.83b

1.9

VAS happy

66.1a

17.9

74.1b

19.4

60.5a

24.7

36.4b

23.5

62.0a

18.7

67.1a

20.1

63.6,

21.5

25.0b

24.1

VAS sad

18.6a

20.4

17.8,

20.3

19.1a

23.1

48.8b

28.1

21.7a

19.9

22.6a

20.7

18.6a

24.1

60.0b

30.1

CD

■D
O
Q.
C
a
o
o
■O
o

Note. Means with different subscripts pre- to posttest differ significantly at p < .01; DACL neg = DACL negative; DACL pos =
CD

a.

DACL positive; VAS = visual analogue scale
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Appendix Q
Repeated Measures Multivariate and Univariate Analyses of Covariance for Selfevaluations after Negative MIP Conditions for Time x Referent x Overgeneralization,
With Depression Score as Covariate (n = 92)

ANCOVA
M ANCOVA
S o u rc e

F(4, 83)

H o n e s ty
F ( l, 86)

G e n e ra l

T]'

F ( l, 86)

A c a d e m ic

Ti'

F (l,8 6 )

S o c ia l
(1. 86)

B e tw e e n -s u b j e c ts e ffe c ts
B D I-II Covariate
R e fe r e n t (R)
O v e rg e n (O G )
R xO G

2.37
.46
3.95”

.16

1.97

.02

7 .8 2 "

.08

13.42” *

.14

.68

.01

1.46
W ith in - s u b je c ts e ffe c ts

T im e (T)

3.12*

.13

.04

.00

4.93*

.05

4.04*

.05

7.29”

.08

TX R

2.95*

.12

.04

.00

6.78*

.07

6.09*

.07

1.54

.02

.13

1.37

.02

3.57

.04

12.00*”

.12

2.56

.03

TxO G
T XR X OG

.60
3.19*

Note. F ratios are Pillai’s approximation of Fs. MANCOVA = multivariate analysis of
covariance; ANCOVA = univariate analysis of covariance; rf = eta squared; BDI-II = Beck
Depression Inventory II; Overgen = pretest overgeneralization (dichotomized into high and
low groups). Univariate F ’s that are significant at Holm’s modified Bonferroni are
indicated in boldface.
*p < .05, **p < .01., ***p < .001
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Appendix R
Frequency of Completing Post-experiment Questionnaire as a Function of Experimental
Condition (N = 179)

Experimental

Completed Questionnaire
Yes

No

Total

Negative-self

2

46

46

Negative-other

5

41

46

Positive-self

9

35

44

Positive-other

10

33

43

26

153

179

Condition

Total

Note. y ^ ( 3. N= 179) = 8.22, E = . 042.
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Appendix S
Frequency of Attentional Foci as a Function of Experimental Condition (n = 138)

Self
Focus

Other
Focus

Both Self
and Other

Total

Negative-self

27

0

6

33

Negative-other

4

11

28

43

Positive-self

23

1

7

31

1

12

31

31

55

24

59

138

Experimental
Condition

Positive-other

Total

Note. 7 -16. N = 138) = 77.68, p < .001
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Appendix T
Frequency of Insight Level as a Function of Experimental Condition (n = 151)

Lack of
Insight

Mood
Manipulation

Insightful

Total

Negative-self

5

15

20

40

Negative-other

5

14

25

44

Positive-self

4

15

15

34

Positive-other

10

10

13

33

Total

24

54

73

151

Experimental
Condition

Note. x^( 6 ,N = 151) = 8.05, E> .05
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Appendix U
Change in Self-evaluations. Pre- to Posttest, as a Function of Experimental Condition
for Insightful Participants

Dependent

N egative-self

Variable

t ( d f = 19 )

Honesty

1.60

General

2.75

Academic

g

Negative-other
t (df =24)

g

2.12

.045

.013

1.46

2.99

.007

Social

2.55

Math
Religion

Positive-self
g

t ( d f = 1 2)

g

-2.44

.029

-1.34

.205

.157

-1.25

.232

.32

.756

1.68

.107

-.01

.997

-.09

.929

.020

1.41

.172

-1.24

.235

.89

.393

1.11

.282

.11

.916

1.60

.132

-1.22

.246

1.71

.104

-.53

.602

-.22

.828

-1.61

.133

.126

t ( d f = 14)

Positive-other

Note. Negative t values indicate an increase in scores from pre- to posttest. Positive t
values indicate a decrease in scores from pre- to posttest.
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Appendix V
Change in Self-Evaluations. Pre- to Posttest, as a Function of Experimental Condition
for Combined Insight Group (Insightful and Mood Manipulation Subgroups')

D ependent

N e g a tiv e - s e lf

V a ria b le

t (d f =34)

H o n e sty

.871

G e n e ra l

2.7 5

A c a d e m ic

g

N e g a tiv e -o th e r

P o s itiv e -s e lf

P o s itiv e -o th e r

t (d f =38)

p

t (d f =29)

g

t (d f =22)

g

1.31

.198

-3 .1 3

.0 0 4

-.01

.9 9 2

.0 0 9

2 .1 7

.0 3 6

-2 .2

.0 3 6

-.7 9 6

.4 3 5

2.9 2

.0 0 6

1.76

.087

.59

.5 5 9

-.2 7

.5 3 7

S o c ia l

2 .1 8

.0 3 7

2 .0 7

.046

-1 .0 8

.291

-.6 9 6

.4 9 4

M a th

.978

.325

1.57

.125

.94

.355

-1.91

.0 6 9

R e lig io n

1.98

.055

.3 7 9

.707

.10

.921

-.65

.5 2 3

.3 9 0

Note. Negative t values indicate an increase in scores from pre- to posttest. Positive t
values indicate a decrease in scores from pre- to posttest.
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Appendix W
Change in Self-Evaluations. Pre- to Posttest, as

a

Function of Experimental Condition

for Combined Insight Group (Lack of Insight and Mood Manipulation Subgroups')

D ependent

N e g a tiv e - s e lf

V a ria b le

t ( d f = 19)

H o n e sty

-1 .3 2

G e n e ra l

1.18

A c a d e m ic

p

N e g a tiv e -o th e r

P o s itiv e -o th e r

p

t ( d f = 18)

p

t ( d f = 19)

g

-1 .3 0

.211

-2 .7 7

.013

.02

.9 8 8

.2 5 2

1.82

.0 8 6

-1 .9 3

.0 6 9

-1 .3 7

.1 8 8

.82

.421

.16

.8 7 7

.85

.4 0 6

.04

.9 7 2

S o cia l

-.3 4

.7 3 7

1.62

.1 2 4

.04

.971

-1 .6 2

.123

M a th

.90

.3 8 0

3 .75

.001

-.0 5

.9 5 9

-1 .5 4

.1 4 0

R e lig io n

1.02

.321

-.2 9

.775

.22

.8 2 7

1.68

.1 0 9

.205

t ( d f = 18)

P o s itiv e - s e lf

Note. Negative t values indicate an increase in scores from pre- to posttest. Positive t
values indicate a decrease in scores from pre- to posttest.
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Appendix X
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Evaluations for Insightful Participants
After Negative MIPs With Pretest Overgeneralization. Referent, and Pretest
Over generalization X Referent (n = 44).

Predictor
Variable

General
B

P

Academic
t(39)

B

.85

1.97

P

Social

t(39)

B

P

t(39)

2.41*

-.03

.57

4.28***

.92

.75

6.60***

-.03

-.19

-.1.09

.02

.10

.64

.67

.09

.12

.64

-.06

-.06

-.39

.29

2.82"

.29

.34

2.94**

.22

.19

1.84

-.29

-2.67*

-.23

-.31

-2.64*

-.09

-.09

-.88

Constant

.90

Pretest
Covariate

.78

.64

4.39"*

.63

BDI-II
Covariate

-.01

-.06

-.38

OG

.08

.08

Referent (R)

.36

Pretest
OGXR

-.31

-.03

Note. Pretest overgeneralization scores were centered before the product term was
calculated. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II; OG = overgeneralization.
p* < .05, p“ < . 0 1 . p “ *<.001

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

144

Appendix Y
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Evaluations for Combined Insight
Group (Insightful and Mood Manipulation Subgroups) After Negative MIPs With
Pretest Overgeneralization. Referent, and Pretest Overgeneralization X Referent (n =
79).

General

Predictor
Variable

B

P

Social

Academic
t(78)

B

1.75

1.85

P

t(78)

B

2.76“

-.23

P

t(78)

Constant

1.32

-.42

Pretest
Covariate

.73

.65

5.76“ *

.64

.58

5.7“ *

.97

.84

11.4*“

BDI-II
Covariate

-.02

-.10

-.81

-.09

-.07

-.51

.02

.12

1.1

Pretest OG

.04

.01

.03

-.04

-.07

-.49

-.05

-.06

-.54

Referent (R)

.24

.21

2.71“

.16

.20

2.23*

.11

.10

1.38

Pretest
OGXR

-.22

-.23

-2.93“

-.18

-.28

-3.1“

-.07

-.08

-1.11

Note. Pretest overgeneralization scores were centered before the product term was
calculated. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II; OG = overgeneralization,
p < .05, p < .01. p

< .001
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Appendix Z
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Evaluations for Combined Insight
Group (Lack of Insight and Mood Manipulation Subgroups) After Negative MIPs
With Pretest Overgeneralization. Referent, and Pretest Overgeneralization X Referent
(n = 38).

Predictor
Variable

Academic

General
B

P

t(33)

B

1.86 *

1.14

Constant

.1.37

Pretest
Covariate

.76

.76

6.09***

.80

BDI-II
Covariate

-.02

-.12

-.92

OG

-.03

-.04

Referent (R)

.06

Pretest
OGXR

-.06

P

Social

t(33)

B

P

t(33)

1.75

.17

.43

.76

7.29***

.94

.94

15.46***

-.00

-.00

-.02

.02

.1.46

1.46

-.25

-.09

-.17

-1.16

-.07

-.10

-. 1.11

.06

.68

.01

.02

.15

-.06

-.06

-.95

-.09

-.93

-.07

-.14

-1.36

.02

.02

.36

Note. Pretest overgeneralization scores were centered before the product term was
calculated. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventor^' II; OG = overgeneralization,
p < .05, p < .01. p

< .001
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